haproxy: Update HAProxy to v2.4.10

- Update haproxy download URL and hash
- Updated upstream patches

Signed-off-by: Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>

10 files changed, 535 insertions, 90 deletions

diff --git a/net/haproxy/Makefile b/net/haproxy/Makefile
index 8423882ba..df16f176b 100644
--- a/net/haproxy/Makefile
+++ b/net/haproxy/Makefile
@@ -10,12 +10,12 @@
 include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
 
 PKG_NAME:=haproxy
-PKG_VERSION:=2.4.9
+PKG_VERSION:=2.4.10
 PKG_RELEASE:=$(AUTORELEASE)
 
 PKG_SOURCE:=$(PKG_NAME)-$(PKG_VERSION).tar.gz
 PKG_SOURCE_URL:=https://www.haproxy.org/download/2.4/src
-PKG_HASH:=d56c7fe3c5afedd1b9a19e1b7f8f954feaf50a9c2f205f99891043858b72a763
+PKG_HASH:=4838dcc961a4544ef2d1e1aa7a7624cffdc4dda731d9cb66e46114819a3b1c5c
 
 PKG_MAINTAINER:=Thomas Heil <heil@terminal-consulting.de>, \
 		Christian Lachner <gladiac@gmail.com>
diff --git a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh
index f91c243db..386fc88c8 100755
--- a/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh
+++ b/net/haproxy/get-latest-patches.sh
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 
 CLONEURL=https://git.haproxy.org/git/haproxy-2.4.git
-BASE_TAG=v2.4.9
+BASE_TAG=v2.4.10
 TMP_REPODIR=tmprepo
 PATCHESDIR=patches
 
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MEDIUM-backend-fix-possible-sockaddr-leak-on-redispatch.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MEDIUM-backend-fix-possible-sockaddr-leak-on-redispatch.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..749375b79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUG-MEDIUM-backend-fix-possible-sockaddr-leak-on-redispatch.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+commit 0a55591b2c9140dee31dbedb6126fbb0b2eb3367
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Fri Dec 24 11:27:53 2021 +0100
+
+    BUG/MEDIUM: backend: fix possible sockaddr leak on redispatch
+    
+    A subtle change of target address allocation was introduced with commit
+    68cf3959b ("MINOR: backend: rewrite alloc of stream target address") in
+    2.4. Prior to this patch, a target address was allocated by function
+    assign_server_address() only if none was previously allocated. After
+    the change, the allocation became unconditional. Most of the time it
+    makes no difference, except when we pass multiple times through
+    connect_server() with SF_ADDR_SET cleared.
+    
+    The most obvious fix would be to avoid allocating that address there
+    when already set, but the root cause is that since introduction of
+    dynamically allocated addresses, the SF_ADDR_SET flag lies. It can
+    be cleared during redispatch or during a queue redistribution without
+    the address being released.
+    
+    This patch instead gives back all its correct meaning to SF_ADDR_SET
+    and guarantees that when not set no address is allocated, by freeing
+    that address at the few places the flag is cleared. The flag could
+    even be removed so that only the address is checked but that would
+    require to touch many areas for no benefit.
+    
+    The easiest way to test it is to send requests to a proxy with l7
+    retries enabled, which forwards to a server returning 500:
+    
+      defaults
+        mode http
+        timeout client 1s
+        timeout server 1s
+        timeout connect 1s
+        retry-on all-retryable-errors
+        retries 1
+        option redispatch
+    
+      listen proxy
+        bind *:5000
+        server app 0.0.0.0:5001
+    
+      frontend dummy-app
+        bind :5001
+        http-request return status 500
+    
+    Issuing "show pools" on the CLI will show that pool "sockaddr" grows
+    as requests are redispatched, and remains stable with the fix. Even
+    "ps" will show that the process' RSS grows by ~160B per request.
+    
+    This fix will need to be backported to 2.4. Note that before 2.5,
+    there's no strm->si[1].dst, strm->target_addr must be used instead.
+    
+    This addresses github issue #1499. Special thanks to Daniil Leontiev
+    for providing a well-documented reproducer.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 266d5405490050adeaf414158f7f4b9bad5298bc)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 11f5fdd07202f2d39b02c48e29b437aacd286c4d)
+    [wt: used target_addr]
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/include/haproxy/stream.h
++++ b/include/haproxy/stream.h
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <haproxy/action-t.h>
+ #include <haproxy/api.h>
++#include <haproxy/connection.h>
+ #include <haproxy/fd.h>
+ #include <haproxy/freq_ctr.h>
+ #include <haproxy/obj_type.h>
+@@ -341,6 +342,7 @@ static inline void stream_choose_redispa
+ 		if (may_dequeue_tasks(objt_server(s->target), s->be))
+ 			process_srv_queue(objt_server(s->target), 0);
+ 
++		sockaddr_free(&s->target_addr);
+ 		s->flags &= ~(SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET);
+ 		si->state = SI_ST_REQ;
+ 	} else {
+--- a/src/queue.c
++++ b/src/queue.c
+@@ -561,6 +561,10 @@ int pendconn_dequeue(struct stream *strm
+ 	strm->flags &= ~(SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET);
+ 	strm->flags |= p->strm_flags & (SF_DIRECT | SF_ASSIGNED | SF_ADDR_SET);
+ 
++	/* the entry might have been redistributed to another server */
++	if (!(strm->flags & SF_ADDR_SET))
++		sockaddr_free(&strm->target_addr);
++
+ 	if (p->target) {
+ 		/* a server picked this pendconn, it must skip LB */
+ 		strm->target = &p->target->obj_type;
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUILD-MINOR-server-fix-compilation-without-SSL.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUILD-MINOR-server-fix-compilation-without-SSL.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9cdab59ff..000000000
--- a/net/haproxy/patches/000-BUILD-MINOR-server-fix-compilation-without-SSL.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-commit ea489aa18caacf057880c67b933689c363307a23
-Author: Amaury Denoyelle <adenoyelle@haproxy.com>
-Date:   Thu Nov 25 10:20:19 2021 +0100
-
-    BUILD/MINOR: server: fix compilation without SSL
-    
-    The build without SSL was broken by the following backported commit:
-      8e99b84dba7755e73563093a8fcedb25e70e7b94
-      MEDIUM: server/backend: implement websocket protocol selection
-    
-    Fix this by checking the ALPN only if USE_OPENSSL and
-    TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation are defined. Else
-    always use the server mux-proto.
-    
-    No need to backport.
-
---- a/src/server.c
-+++ b/src/server.c
-@@ -204,7 +204,33 @@ void srv_set_dyncookie(struct server *s)
-  */
- int srv_check_reuse_ws(struct server *srv)
- {
--	if (srv->mux_proto || srv->use_ssl != 1 || !srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str) {
-+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
-+	if (!srv->mux_proto && srv->use_ssl && srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str) {
-+		/* ALPN selection.
-+		 * Based on the assumption that only "h2" and "http/1.1" token
-+		 * are used on server ALPN.
-+		 */
-+		const struct ist alpn = ist2(srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str,
-+		                             srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_len);
-+
-+		switch (srv->ws) {
-+		case SRV_WS_AUTO:
-+			/* for auto mode, consider reuse as possible if the
-+			 * server uses a single protocol ALPN
-+			 */
-+			if (!istchr(alpn, ','))
-+				return 1;
-+			break;
-+
-+		case SRV_WS_H2:
-+			return isteq(alpn, ist("\x02h2"));
-+
-+		case SRV_WS_H1:
-+			return isteq(alpn, ist("\x08http/1.1"));
-+		}
-+	}
-+	else {
-+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL) && defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) */
- 		/* explicit srv.mux_proto or no ALPN : srv.mux_proto is used
- 		 * for mux selection.
- 		 */
-@@ -232,31 +258,9 @@ int srv_check_reuse_ws(struct server *sr
- 				return 1;
- 			break;
- 		}
-+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
- 	}
--	else {
--		/* ALPN selection.
--		 * Based on the assumption that only "h2" and "http/1.1" token
--		 * are used on server ALPN.
--		 */
--		const struct ist alpn = ist2(srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_str,
--		                             srv->ssl_ctx.alpn_len);
--
--		switch (srv->ws) {
--		case SRV_WS_AUTO:
--			/* for auto mode, consider reuse as possible if the
--			 * server uses a single protocol ALPN
--			 */
--			if (!istchr(alpn, ','))
--				return 1;
--			break;
--
--		case SRV_WS_H2:
--			return isteq(alpn, ist("\x02h2"));
--
--		case SRV_WS_H1:
--			return isteq(alpn, ist("\x08http/1.1"));
--		}
--	}
-+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL) && defined(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) */
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-pools-dont-mark-ourselves-as-harmless-in-DEBUG_UAF-mode.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-pools-dont-mark-ourselves-as-harmless-in-DEBUG_UAF-mode.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f666c2482
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/001-BUG-MINOR-pools-dont-mark-ourselves-as-harmless-in-DEBUG_UAF-mode.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+commit 78bc9d39b0b31d647b35131ae45b21a145112192
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Fri Nov 12 10:26:18 2021 +0100
+
+    BUG/MINOR: pools: don't mark ourselves as harmless in DEBUG_UAF mode
+    
+    When haproxy is built with DEBUG_UAF=1, some particularly slow
+    allocation functions are used for each pool, and it was not uncommon
+    to see the watchdog trigger during performance tests. For this reason
+    the allocation functions were surrounded by a pair of thread_harmless
+    calls to mention that the function was waiting in slow syscalls. The
+    problem is that this also releases functions blocked in thread_isolate()
+    which can then start their work.
+    
+    In order to protect against the accidental removal of a shared resource
+    in this situation, in 2.5-dev4 with commit ba3ab7907 ("MEDIUM: servers:
+    make the server deletion code run under full thread isolation") was added
+    thread_isolate_full() for functions which want to be totally protected
+    due to being manipulating some data.
+    
+    But this is not sufficient, because there are still places where we
+    can allocate/free (thus sleep) under a lock, such as in long call
+    chains involving the release of an idle connection. In this case, if
+    one thread asks for isolation, one thread might hang in
+    pool_alloc_area_uaf() with a lock held (for example the conns_lock
+    when coming from conn_backend_get()->h1_takeover()->task_new()), with
+    another thread blocked on a lock waiting for that one to release it,
+    both keeping their bit clear in the thread_harmless mask, preventing
+    the first thread from being released, thus causing a deadlock.
+    
+    In addition to this, it was already seen that the "show fd" CLI handler
+    could wake up during a pool_free_area_uaf() with an incompletely
+    released memory area while deleting a file descriptor, and be fooled
+    showing bad pointers, or during a pool_alloc() on another thread that
+    was in the process of registering a freshly allocated connection to a
+    new file descriptor.
+    
+    One solution could consist in replacing all thread_isolate() calls by
+    thread_isolate_full() but then that makes thread_isolate() useless
+    and only shifts the problem by one slot.
+    
+    A better approach could possibly consist in having a way to mark that
+    a thread is entering an extremely slow section. Such sections would
+    be timed so that this is not abused, and the bit would be used to
+    make the watchdog more patient. This would be acceptable as this would
+    only affect debugging.
+    
+    The approach used here for now consists in removing the harmless bits
+    around the UAF allocator, thus essentially undoing commit 85b2cae63
+    ("MINOR: pools: make the thread harmless during the mmap/munmap
+    syscalls").
+    
+    This is marked as minor because nobody is expected to be running with
+    DEBUG_UAF outside of development or serious debugging, so this issue
+    cannot affect regular users. It must be backported to stable branches
+    that have thread_harmless_now() around the mmap() call.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit fdf53b4962229b6cfcc5bc11151356c3d92d7023)
+    [wt: applied to include/pool-os.h]
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/include/haproxy/pool-os.h
++++ b/include/haproxy/pool-os.h
+@@ -65,12 +65,8 @@ static inline void pool_free_area(void *
+ static inline void *pool_alloc_area(size_t size)
+ {
+ 	size_t pad = (4096 - size) & 0xFF0;
+-	int isolated;
+ 	void *ret;
+ 
+-	isolated = thread_isolated();
+-	if (!isolated)
+-		thread_harmless_now();
+ 	ret = mmap(NULL, (size + 4095) & -4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ 	if (ret != MAP_FAILED) {
+ 		/* let's dereference the page before returning so that the real
+@@ -83,8 +79,6 @@ static inline void *pool_alloc_area(size
+ 	} else {
+ 		ret = NULL;
+ 	}
+-	if (!isolated)
+-		thread_harmless_end();
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -101,9 +95,7 @@ static inline void pool_free_area(void *
+ 	if (pad >= sizeof(void *) && *(void **)(area - sizeof(void *)) != area)
+ 		ABORT_NOW();
+ 
+-	thread_harmless_now();
+ 	munmap(area - pad, (size + 4095) & -4096);
+-	thread_harmless_end();
+ }
+ 
+ #endif /* DEBUG_UAF */
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUILD-cli-clear-a-maybe-unused-warning-on-some-older-compilers.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUILD-cli-clear-a-maybe-unused-warning-on-some-older-compilers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..72c93f091
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/002-BUILD-cli-clear-a-maybe-unused-warning-on-some-older-compilers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+commit b9aac36d8d8d3bb05c785aa8f6630338d078f64a
+Author: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date:   Sat Nov 20 19:17:38 2021 +0100
+
+    BUILD: cli: clear a maybe-unused  warning on some older compilers
+    
+    The SHOW_TOT() and SHOW_AVG() macros used in cli_io_handler_show_activity()
+    produce a warning on gcc 4.7 on MIPS with threads disabled because the
+    compiler doesn't know that global.nbthread is necessarily non-null, hence
+    that at least one iteration is performed. Let's just change the loop for
+    a do {} while () that lets the compiler know it's always initialized. It
+    also has the tiny benefit of making the code shorter.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 97b5d07a3e5a33552327bac2e4c9c6a0496f7b5e)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/src/cli.c
++++ b/src/cli.c
+@@ -1368,8 +1368,10 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_activity(
+ 		unsigned int _v[MAX_THREADS];				\
+ 		unsigned int _tot;					\
+ 		const unsigned int _nbt = global.nbthread;		\
+-		for (_tot = t = 0; t < _nbt; t++)			\
++		_tot = t = 0;						\
++		do {							\
+ 			_tot += _v[t] = (x);				\
++		} while (++t < _nbt);					\
+ 		if (_nbt == 1) {					\
+ 			chunk_appendf(&trash, " %u\n", _tot);		\
+ 			break;						\
+@@ -1386,8 +1388,10 @@ static int cli_io_handler_show_activity(
+ 		unsigned int _v[MAX_THREADS];				\
+ 		unsigned int _tot;					\
+ 		const unsigned int _nbt = global.nbthread;		\
+-		for (_tot = t = 0; t < _nbt; t++)			\
++		_tot = t = 0;						\
++		do {							\
+ 			_tot += _v[t] = (x);				\
++		} while (++t < _nbt);					\
+ 		if (_nbt == 1) {					\
+ 			chunk_appendf(&trash, " %u\n", _tot);		\
+ 			break;						\
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUILD-ssl-unbreak-the-build-with-newer-libressl.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUILD-ssl-unbreak-the-build-with-newer-libressl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cf9154bec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/003-BUILD-ssl-unbreak-the-build-with-newer-libressl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+commit f9c40ed93330c9add953310b7ac04a0d4f43ec5c
+Author: Daniel Jakots <haproxy@chown.me>
+Date:   Tue Dec 7 20:34:39 2021 -0500
+
+    BUILD: ssl: unbreak the build with newer libressl
+    
+    In LibreSSL 3.5.0, BIO is going to become opaque, so haproxy's
+    compat macros will no longer work. The functions they substitute
+    have been available since LibreSSL 2.7.0.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit d1a2e2b0d1da0dff726738343fbaed044fb93470)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit ca0b6e08dcc3686794d37e8bfcc4e4a4b2adb806)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/include/haproxy/openssl-compat.h
++++ b/include/haproxy/openssl-compat.h
+@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ static inline void SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CT
+ #define SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(ctx, chain) do { *(chain) = (ctx)->extra_certs; } while (0)
+ #endif
+ 
+-#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if HA_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L && (!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+ #define BIO_get_data(b)            (b)->ptr
+ #define BIO_set_data(b, v)         do { (b)->ptr  = (v); } while (0)
+ #define BIO_set_init(b, v)         do { (b)->init = (v); } while (0)
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/004-DOC-fix-misspelled-keyword-resolve_retries-in-resolvers.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/004-DOC-fix-misspelled-keyword-resolve_retries-in-resolvers.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3663330c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/004-DOC-fix-misspelled-keyword-resolve_retries-in-resolvers.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+commit fc13f79e8f8090018109e5c91e4e4e55a7105146
+Author: Thierry Fournier <thierry.fournier@ozon.io>
+Date:   Wed Dec 15 19:03:52 2021 +0100
+
+    DOC: fix misspelled keyword "resolve_retries" in resolvers
+    
+    "resolve_retries" was spelled "resolve_retires".
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 55c40ea17778b1afa3cf8f0f0a2cc42717c9364a)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 8bb445d66b1bfddd77e3cf25973a642212d90880)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/doc/configuration.txt
++++ b/doc/configuration.txt
+@@ -15145,7 +15145,7 @@ used by HAProxy. The following processin
+   2. When the fallback on the query type was done (or not applicable), HAProxy
+      retries the original DNS query, with the preferred query type.
+ 
+-  3. HAProxy retries previous steps <resolve_retires> times. If no valid
++  3. HAProxy retries previous steps <resolve_retries> times. If no valid
+      response is received after that, it stops the DNS resolution and reports
+      the error.
+ 
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-initialize-correctly-ssl-w-default-server.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-initialize-correctly-ssl-w-default-server.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8b63ed871
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/005-BUG-MEDIUM-ssl-initialize-correctly-ssl-w-default-server.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+commit 6338b7d4a884639f98823e885325a50750f72e04
+Author: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+Date:   Tue Dec 28 18:47:17 2021 +0100
+
+    BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: initialize correctly ssl w/ default-server
+    
+    This bug was introduced by d817dc73 ("MEDIUM: ssl: Load client
+    certificates in a ckch for backend servers") in which the creation of
+    the SSL_CTX for a server was moved to the configuration parser when
+    using a "crt" keyword instead of being done in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx().
+    
+    The patch 0498fa40 ("BUG/MINOR: ssl: Default-server configuration ignored by
+    server") made it worse by setting the same SSL_CTX for every servers
+    using a default-server. Resulting in any SSL option on a server applied
+    to every server in its backend.
+    
+    This patch fixes the issue by reintroducing a string which store the
+    path of certificate inside the server structure, and loading the
+    certificate in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() again.
+    
+    This is a quick fix to backport, a cleaner way can be achieve by always
+    creating the SSL_CTX in ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() and splitting
+    properly the ssl_sock_load_srv_cert() function.
+    
+    This patch fixes issue #1488.
+    
+    Must be backported as far as 2.4.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 2c776f1c30c85be11c9ba8ca8d9a7d62690d1a32)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 2f3c354b6cdc21ee185e263b5c7422c86ae58c98)
+    [wt: ssl_sock_load_srv_cert() doesn't take the create_if_none arg in 2.4,
+         thus adjust context and make sure ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx() matches
+         what srv_parse_crt() used to do]
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/include/haproxy/server-t.h
++++ b/include/haproxy/server-t.h
+@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ struct server {
+ 		char *verify_host;              /* hostname of certificate must match this host */
+ 		char *ca_file;			/* CAfile to use on verify */
+ 		char *crl_file;			/* CRLfile to use on verify */
++		char *client_crt;		/* client certificate to send */
+ 		struct sample_expr *sni;        /* sample expression for SNI */
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
+ 		char *npn_str;                  /* NPN protocol string */
+--- a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc
++++ b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'versi
+ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'feature(OPENSSL)'"
+ feature ignore_unknown_macro
+ 
+-server s1 -repeat 7 {
++server s1 -repeat 10 {
+   rxreq
+   txresp
+ } -start
+@@ -56,7 +56,10 @@ haproxy h1 -conf {
+ 
+     backend third_be
+         default-server ssl crt client1.pem ca-file ca-auth.crt verify none
+-        server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem
++        server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
++        server s2 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem
++        server s3 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
++        server s4 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
+ 
+     backend fourth_be
+         default-server ssl crt client1.pem verify none
+@@ -106,9 +109,25 @@ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
+     txreq
+     rxresp
+     expect resp.status == 200
++    expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok"
++} -run
++
++client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
++    txreq -url "/third"
++    txreq
++    rxresp
++    expect resp.status == 200
+     expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Expired"
+ } -run
+ 
++client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} -repeat 2 {
++    txreq -url "/third"
++    txreq
++    rxresp
++    expect resp.status == 200
++    expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok"
++} -run
++
+ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
+     txreq -url "/fourth"
+     txreq
+--- a/src/cfgparse-ssl.c
++++ b/src/cfgparse-ssl.c
+@@ -1450,25 +1450,17 @@ static int srv_parse_crl_file(char **arg
+ /* parse the "crt" server keyword */
+ static int srv_parse_crt(char **args, int *cur_arg, struct proxy *px, struct server *newsrv, char **err)
+ {
+-	int retval = -1;
+-	char *path = NULL;
+-
+ 	if (!*args[*cur_arg + 1]) {
+ 		memprintf(err, "'%s' : missing certificate file path", args[*cur_arg]);
+ 		return ERR_ALERT | ERR_FATAL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((*args[*cur_arg + 1] != '/') && global_ssl.crt_base)
+-		memprintf(&path, "%s/%s", global_ssl.crt_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]);
++		memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s/%s", global_ssl.crt_base, args[*cur_arg + 1]);
+ 	else
+-		memprintf(&path, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]);
+-
+-	if (path) {
+-		retval = ssl_sock_load_srv_cert(path, newsrv, err);
+-		free(path);
+-	}
++		memprintf(&newsrv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, "%s", args[*cur_arg + 1]);
+ 
+-	return retval;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+ /* parse the "no-check-ssl" server keyword */
+--- a/src/server.c
++++ b/src/server.c
+@@ -2063,6 +2063,8 @@ static void srv_conn_src_cpy(struct serv
+ static void srv_ssl_settings_cpy(struct server *srv, struct server *src)
+ {
+ 	/* <src> is the current proxy's default server and SSL is enabled */
++	BUG_ON(src->ssl_ctx.ctx != NULL); /* the SSL_CTX must never be initialized in a default-server */
++
+ 	if (src == &srv->proxy->defsrv && src->use_ssl == 1)
+ 		srv->flags |= SRV_F_DEFSRV_USE_SSL;
+ 
+@@ -2070,10 +2072,11 @@ static void srv_ssl_settings_cpy(struct
+ 		srv->ssl_ctx.ca_file = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.ca_file);
+ 	if (src->ssl_ctx.crl_file != NULL)
+ 		srv->ssl_ctx.crl_file = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.crl_file);
++	if (src->ssl_ctx.client_crt != NULL)
++		srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.client_crt);
+ 
+ 	srv->ssl_ctx.verify = src->ssl_ctx.verify;
+ 
+-	srv->ssl_ctx.ctx = src->ssl_ctx.ctx;
+ 
+ 	if (src->ssl_ctx.verify_host != NULL)
+ 		srv->ssl_ctx.verify_host = strdup(src->ssl_ctx.verify_host);
+--- a/src/ssl_sock.c
++++ b/src/ssl_sock.c
+@@ -4669,7 +4669,7 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct serv
+ {
+ 	struct proxy *curproxy = srv->proxy;
+ 	int cfgerr = 0;
+-	SSL_CTX *ctx = srv->ssl_ctx.ctx;
++	SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ 
+ 	/* Make sure openssl opens /dev/urandom before the chroot */
+ 	if (!ssl_initialize_random()) {
+@@ -4693,6 +4693,26 @@ int ssl_sock_prepare_srv_ctx(struct serv
+ 	if (srv->use_ssl == 1)
+ 		srv->xprt = &ssl_sock;
+ 
++	if (srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt) {
++		char *err = NULL;
++		int err_code = 0;
++
++		/* If there is a crt keyword there, the SSL_CTX will be created here. */
++		err_code = ssl_sock_load_srv_cert(srv->ssl_ctx.client_crt, srv, &err);
++		if (err_code != ERR_NONE) {
++			if ((err_code & ERR_WARN) && !(err_code & ERR_ALERT))
++				ha_warning("%s", err);
++			else
++				ha_alert("%s", err);
++
++			if (err_code & (ERR_FATAL|ERR_ABORT))
++				cfgerr++;
++		}
++		ha_free(&err);
++	}
++
++	ctx = srv->ssl_ctx.ctx;
++
+ 	/* The context will be uninitialized if there wasn't any "cert" option
+ 	 * in the server line. */
+ 	if (!ctx) {
diff --git a/net/haproxy/patches/006-REGTESTS-ssl-fix-ssl_default_server-vtc.patch b/net/haproxy/patches/006-REGTESTS-ssl-fix-ssl_default_server-vtc.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cab9a6c9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/haproxy/patches/006-REGTESTS-ssl-fix-ssl_default_server-vtc.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+commit 7c565501e91f3759274dd7cd43ec9de7c4b9a162
+Author: William Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 29 18:16:27 2021 +0100
+
+    REGTESTS: ssl: fix ssl_default_server.vtc
+    
+    Patch 2c776f1 ("BUG/MEDIUM: ssl: initialize correctly ssl w/
+    default-server") added tests that are not relevant anymore and broke the
+    reg-test. revert them.
+    
+    (cherry picked from commit 0387632ac0db520402550cf19a96d41f8c1661de)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+    (cherry picked from commit 5229b2badbc370ef11ad5c6a7c9529bd24b2de66)
+    Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+--- a/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc
++++ b/reg-tests/ssl/ssl_default_server.vtc
+@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'versi
+ feature cmd "$HAPROXY_PROGRAM -cc 'feature(OPENSSL)'"
+ feature ignore_unknown_macro
+ 
+-server s1 -repeat 10 {
++server s1 -repeat 7 {
+   rxreq
+   txresp
+ } -start
+@@ -56,10 +56,7 @@ haproxy h1 -conf {
+ 
+     backend third_be
+         default-server ssl crt client1.pem ca-file ca-auth.crt verify none
+-        server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
+-        server s2 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem
+-        server s3 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
+-        server s4 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock"
++        server s1 "${tmpdir}/ssl.sock" crt client2_expired.pem
+ 
+     backend fourth_be
+         default-server ssl crt client1.pem verify none
+@@ -109,25 +106,9 @@ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
+     txreq
+     rxresp
+     expect resp.status == 200
+-    expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok"
+-} -run
+-
+-client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
+-    txreq -url "/third"
+-    txreq
+-    rxresp
+-    expect resp.status == 200
+     expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Expired"
+ } -run
+ 
+-client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} -repeat 2 {
+-    txreq -url "/third"
+-    txreq
+-    rxresp
+-    expect resp.status == 200
+-    expect resp.http.x-ssl == "Ok"
+-} -run
+-
+ client c1 -connect ${h1_clearlst_sock} {
+     txreq -url "/fourth"
+     txreq