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/*
* openvpn.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2011-22 - ntop.org
*
*
* nDPI is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* nDPI is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
* along with nDPI. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#include "ndpi_protocol_ids.h"
#define NDPI_CURRENT_PROTO NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN
#include "ndpi_api.h"
#include "ndpi_private.h"
/*
* OpenVPN TCP / UDP Detection - 128/160 hmac
*
* Detection based upon these openvpn protocol properties:
* - opcode
* - packet ID
* - session ID
*
* TODO
* - Support PSK only mode (instead of TLS)
* - Support PSK + TLS mode (PSK used for early authentication)
* - TLS certificate extraction
*
*/
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 (0x01 << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 (0x02 << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_V1 (0x04 << 3)
#define P_ACK_V1 (0x05 << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 (0x07 << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 (0x08 << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 (0x0A << 3)
#define P_CONTROL_WKC_V1 (0x0B << 3)
#define P_OPCODE_MASK 0xF8
#define P_SHA1_HMAC_SIZE 20
#define P_HMAC_128 16 // (RSA-)MD5, (RSA-)MD4, ..others
#define P_HMAC_160 20 // (RSA-|DSA-)SHA(1), ..others, SHA1 is openvpn default
#define P_HMAC_NONE 0 // No HMAC
#define P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hmac_size) (9 + hmac_size)
#define P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size) (P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hmac_size) + 8 * (!!(hmac_size)))
static int is_opcode_valid(u_int8_t opcode)
{
/* Ignore:
* P_DATA_V1/2: they don't have any (useful) info in the header
* P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1: it is used to key renegotiation -> it is not at the beginning of the session
*/
return opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_V1 ||
opcode == P_ACK_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_WKC_V1;
}
static u_int32_t get_packet_id(const u_int8_t * payload, u_int8_t hms) {
return(ntohl(*(u_int32_t*)(payload + P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(hms))));
}
/* From wireshark */
/* We check the leading 4 byte of a suspected hmac for 0x00 bytes,
if more than 1 byte out of the 4 provided contains 0x00, the
hmac is considered not valid, which suggests that no tls auth is used.
unfortunatly there is no other way to detect tls auth on the fly */
static int check_for_valid_hmac(u_int32_t hmac)
{
int c = 0;
if((hmac & 0x000000FF) == 0x00000000)
c++;
if((hmac & 0x0000FF00) == 0x00000000)
c++;
if ((hmac & 0x00FF0000) == 0x00000000)
c++;
if ((hmac & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)
c++;
if (c > 1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int8_t detect_hmac_size(const u_int8_t *payload, int payload_len) {
// try to guess
if((payload_len >= P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(P_HMAC_160) + 4) &&
get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_160) == 1)
return P_HMAC_160;
if((payload_len >= P_HARD_RESET_PACKET_ID_OFFSET(P_HMAC_128) + 4) &&
get_packet_id(payload, P_HMAC_128) == 1)
return P_HMAC_128;
/* Heuristic from Wireshark, to detect no-HMAC flows (i.e. tls-crypt) */
if(payload_len >= 14 &&
!(payload[9] > 0 &&
check_for_valid_hmac(ntohl(*(u_int32_t*)(payload + 9)))))
return P_HMAC_NONE;
return(-1);
}
static void ndpi_search_openvpn(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct* ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct* flow) {
struct ndpi_packet_struct* packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
const u_int8_t * ovpn_payload = packet->payload;
const u_int8_t * session_remote;
u_int8_t opcode;
u_int8_t alen;
int8_t hmac_size;
int8_t failed = 0;
/* No u_ */int16_t ovpn_payload_len = packet->payload_packet_len;
int dir = packet->packet_direction;
/* Detection:
* (1) server and client resets matching (via session id -> remote session id)
* (2) consecutive packets (in both directions) with the same session id
* (3) asymmetric traffic
*/
if(ovpn_payload_len < 14 + 2 * (packet->tcp != NULL)) {
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
/* Skip openvpn TCP transport packet size */
if(packet->tcp != NULL)
ovpn_payload += 2, ovpn_payload_len -= 2;
opcode = ovpn_payload[0] & P_OPCODE_MASK;
if(!is_opcode_valid(opcode)) {
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
/* Maybe a strong assumption... */
if((ovpn_payload[0] & ~P_OPCODE_MASK) != 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid key id\n");
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] == 1 &&
!(opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid first packet\n");
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] == 1 &&
packet->tcp &&
ntohs(*(u_int16_t *)(packet->payload)) != ovpn_payload_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid tcp len on reset\n");
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "[packets %d/%d][opcode: %u][len: %u]\n",
flow->packet_direction_counter[dir],
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir],
opcode, ovpn_payload_len);
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] > 1) {
if(memcmp(flow->ovpn_session_id[dir], ovpn_payload + 1, 8) != 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid session id on two consecutive pkts in the same dir\n");
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] >= 2 &&
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] >= 2) {
/* (2) */
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn (session ids match on both direction)\n");
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
return;
}
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[dir] >= 4 &&
flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] == 0) {
/* (3) */
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn (asymmetric)\n");
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
return;
}
} else {
memcpy(flow->ovpn_session_id[dir], ovpn_payload + 1, 8);
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Session key [%d]: 0x%lx\n", dir,
ndpi_ntohll(*(u_int64_t *)flow->ovpn_session_id[dir]));
}
/* (1) */
if(flow->packet_direction_counter[!dir] > 0 &&
(opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1 ||
opcode == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2)) {
hmac_size = detect_hmac_size(ovpn_payload, ovpn_payload_len);
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "hmac size %d\n", hmac_size);
failed = 1;
if(hmac_size >= 0 &&
P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size) < ovpn_payload_len) {
u_int16_t offset = P_PACKET_ID_ARRAY_LEN_OFFSET(hmac_size);
alen = ovpn_payload[offset];
if(alen > 0) {
offset += 1 + alen * 4;
if((offset + 8) <= ovpn_payload_len) {
session_remote = &ovpn_payload[offset];
if(memcmp(flow->ovpn_session_id[!dir], session_remote, 8) == 0) {
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct,"found openvpn\n");
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
return;
} else {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "key mismatch 0x%lx\n", ndpi_ntohll(*(u_int64_t *)session_remote));
}
}
} else {
failed = 0; /* Server reset without remote session id field */
}
}
}
if(failed)
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
if(flow->packet_counter > 5)
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
}
void init_openvpn_dissector(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
u_int32_t *id) {
ndpi_set_bitmask_protocol_detection("OpenVPN", ndpi_struct, *id,
NDPI_PROTOCOL_OPENVPN,
ndpi_search_openvpn,
NDPI_SELECTION_BITMASK_PROTOCOL_V4_V6_TCP_OR_UDP_WITH_PAYLOAD_WITHOUT_RETRANSMISSION,
SAVE_DETECTION_BITMASK_AS_UNKNOWN,
ADD_TO_DETECTION_BITMASK);
*id += 1;
}
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