| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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This function is always called once for every flow, as last code
processing the flow itself.
As a first usage example, check here if the flow is unidirectional
(instead of checking it at every packets)
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Removing JA3C is an big task. Let's start with a simple change having an
huge impact on unit tests: remove printing of JA3C information from
ndpiReader.
This way, when we will delete the actual code, the unit tests diffs
should be a lot simpler to look at.
Note that the information if the client/server cipher is weak or
obsolete is still available via flow risk
See: #2551
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In very old (G)QUIC versions by Google, the user agent was available on
plain text. That is not true anymore, since about end of 2021.
See: https://github.com/google/quiche/commit/f282c934f4731a9f4be93409c9f3e8687f0566a7
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Show JA4C and JA3S information (instead of JA3C and JA3S)
See #2551 for context
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Even if it is only the proposed value by the client (and not the
negotiated one), it might be use as hint for timeout by the (external)
flows manager
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If the flow is classified (via DPI) after the first packet, we should
use this information as FPC
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Add printing of fpc_dns statistics and add a general cconfiguration option.
Rework the code to be more generic and ready to handle other logics.
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Let's start with some basic helpers and with FPC based on flow addresses.
See: #2322
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Since 070a0908b we are able to detect P2P calls directly from the packet
content, without any correlation among flows
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This cache was added in b6b4967aa, when there was no real Zoom support.
With 63f349319, a proper identification of multimedia stream has been
added, making this cache quite useless: any improvements on Zoom
classification should be properly done in Zoom dissector.
Tested for some months with a few 10Gbits links of residential traffic: the
cache pretty much never returned a valid hit.
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QUIC decryption fails when the Client Hello is split into multiple UDP
packets and these packets have different Destination Connection IDs
(because the server told the client to switch to a different CID; see
RFC 9000 7.2)
```
The Destination Connection ID field from the first Initial packet sent by
a client is used to determine packet protection keys for Initial packets.
[..]
Upon first receiving an Initial or Retry packet from the server, the
client uses the Source Connection ID supplied by the server as the
Destination Connection ID for subsequent packets
```
From a logical point of view, the ciphers used for decryption should be
initialized only once, with the first Initial pkt sent by the client and
kept for later usage with the following packets (if any).
However it seems that we can safely initialize them at each packet, if
we keep using the DCID of the **first** packet sent by the client.
Keep initializing the ciphers at each packet greatly simplifie this patch.
This issue has been undetected for so long because:
* in the vast majority of the cases we only decrypt one packet per flow;
* the available traces with the Client Hello split into multiple packets
(i.e. cases where we need to decrypt at least two packets per flow) were
created in a simple test environment to simulate Post-Quantum handshake,
and in that scenario the client sent all the packets (with the same
DCID) before any reply from the server.
However, in the last months all major browsers started supporting PQ
key, so it is now common to have split CH in real traffic.
Please note that in the attached example, the CH is split into 2
(in-order) fragments (in different UDP packets) and the second one in
turn is divided into 9 (out-of-order) CRYPTO frames; the reassembler
code works out-of-the-box even in this (new) scenario.
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