| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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We use `registr_dissector()` instead of
`ndpi_set_bitmask_protocol_detection()`.
Every file in `src/lib/protocols/*.c` is a dissector.
Every dissector can handle multiple protocols.
The real goal is this small change:
```
struct call_function_struct {
- NDPI_PROTOCOL_BITMASK detection_bitmask;
```
i.e. getting rid of another protocol bitmask: this is mandatory to try
to fix #2136 (see also e845e8205b68752c997d05224d8b2fd45acde714)
As a nice side effect, we remove a bitmask comparison in the hot function
`check_ndpi_detection_func()`
TODO: change logging configuration from per-protocol to per-dissector
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* Removed dupe extension
* Removed ECH from suspicious extensions
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This is the first, tiny, step into a better separation between
"protocols" and "dissectors"
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Renamed ndpi_search_tls_udp to ndpi_search_dtls
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Cloudflare CDN
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Follow-up of f56831336334dddcff00eaf2132e5e0f226f0e32: now the
configuration is for flow-risk, not global
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That flow risk was introduced in 79b89d286605635f15edfe3c21297aaa3b5f3acf
but we can now use the generic `NDPI_TLS_SUSPICIOUS_EXTENSION` instead:
ESNI is quite suspicious nowadays in itself (i.e. even without SNI).
Note that ESNI support has been removed in cae9fb9989838f213eeb857b8fc4bbeac6940049
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These flows are already classified as TLS.RDP.
This change also fix a memory leak
```
Direct leak of 62 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x5883d762429f in __interceptor_malloc /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:68:3
#1 0x5883d76fe46a in ndpi_malloc ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_memory.c:57:46
#2 0x5883d76fe46a in ndpi_strdup ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_memory.c:110:13
#3 0x5883d77adcd6 in ndpi_compute_ja4 ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2298:46
#4 0x5883d77ab2ec in processClientServerHello ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:3314:10
#5 0x5883d77a4c51 in processTLSBlock ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1319:5
```
Found by oss-fuzz.
See: https://oss-fuzz.com/testcase-detail/5244512192757760
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For the most common protocols, avoid creating the string message if we
are not going to use it
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If we have a (potential) valid sub-classification, we shoudn't check for
DGA, even if the subclassification itself is disabled!
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In some scenarios, you might not be interested in flow metadata or
flow-risks at all, but you might want only flow (sub-)classification.
Examples: you only want to forward the traffic according to the
classification or you are only interested in some protocol statistics.
Create a new configuration file (for `ndpiReader`, but you can trivially
adapt it for the library itself) allowing exactly that. You can use it
via: `ndpiReader --conf=example/only_classification.conf ...`
Note that this way, the nDPI overhead is lower because it might need
less packets per flow:
* TLS: nDPI processes only the CH (in most cases) and not also the SH
and certificates
* DNS: only the request is processed (instead of both request and
response)
We might extend the same "shortcut-logic" (stop processing the flow
immediately when there is a final sub-classification) for others
protocols.
Add the configuration options to enable/disable the extraction of some
TLS metadata.
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mis-mapping to s3 (#2684)
* JA4: Fix SSL 2 version constant to 0x0002
SSL 2 uses a version field of 0x0002, not 0x0200. This is confirmed not
only in the original Netscape spec [1] and RFC draft of the time [2],
but also in major implementations such as OpenSSL [3] and Wireshark [4].
An earlier version of the JA4 spec [5] also mistakenly used 0x0200 for
SSL 2 and 0x0100 for SSL 1. This was fixed in [6] in August 2024.
[1] https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hickman-netscape-ssl-00
[3] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_6m/ssl/ssl2.h#L66-L71
[4] https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/release-4.4/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.h#L266-L277
[5] https://github.com/FoxIO-LLC/ja4/blob/main/technical_details/JA4.md#tls-and-dtls-version
[6] FoxIO-LLC/ja4#150
* JA4: Remove fictional (and mis-mapped to "s3") SSL 1
SSL 1 was never actually deployed, the design was iterated upon to
become SSL 2 before it was released by Netscape [1] [2] [3] [4]. I
don't think it's public knowledge what the version field for SSL 1 would
have looked like, or if it even was two bytes large or at the same
offset on the wire; given that SSL 2 used 0x0002 it seems more likely to
have been 0x0001 than 0x0100.
Version field 0x0100, that is currently misattributed to SSL 1, was used
by an early pre-RFC4347 implementation of DTLS in OpenSSL before 0.9.8f
[5], when OpenSSL switched to the version field specified by RFC4347.
This use of 0x0100 is also reflected in Wireshark's TLS dissector [4]
(`DTLSV1DOT0_OPENSSL_VERSION`).
For these reasons, it seems to make sense to remove the fictional SSL 1
code entirely.
This also removes an issue where the resulting JA4 string would be "s3"
instead of the intended "s1".
An earlier version of the JA4 spec [6] also mistakenly used 0x0200 for
SSL 2 and 0x0100 for SSL 1. This was fixed in [7] in August 2024.
[1] https://www-archive.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/ssl/draft02.html
[2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hickman-netscape-ssl-00
[3] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL_0_9_6m/ssl/ssl2.h#L66-L71
[4] https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/blob/release-4.4/epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.h#L266-L277
[5] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/compare/OpenSSL_0_9_8e...OpenSSL_0_9_8f
[6] https://github.com/FoxIO-LLC/ja4/blob/main/technical_details/JA4.md#tls-and-dtls-version
[7] FoxIO-LLC/ja4#150
* Fix tests where old DTLS (0x0100) was mis-identified as SSL 3.0
These two tests contain DTLS flows using a version field of 0x0100 as
used by OpenSSL pre 0.9.8f, before OpenSSL switched to the standardised
version code points for its DTLS implementation. The correct JA4
mapping is "d00", not "ds3".
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Last step of removing JA3C fingerprint
Remove some duplicate tests: testing with ja4c/ja3s disabled is already
performed by `disable_metadata_and_flowrisks` configuration.
Close:#2551
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It might be usefull to be able to match traffic against a list of
suspicious JA4C fingerprints
Use the same code/logic/infrastructure used for JA3C (note that we are
going to remove JA3C...)
See: #2551
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In very old (G)QUIC versions by Google, the user agent was available on
plain text. That is not true anymore, since about end of 2021.
See: https://github.com/google/quiche/commit/f282c934f4731a9f4be93409c9f3e8687f0566a7
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Add a new variable to keep track of internal partial classification
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Even if it is only the proposed value by the client (and not the
negotiated one), it might be use as hint for timeout by the (external)
flows manager
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We should set it also for "obsolete"/"insecure" ciphers, not only for
the "weak" ones.
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ESNI has been superseded by ECH for years, now.
See: https://blog.cloudflare.com/encrypted-client-hello/
Set the existing flow risk if we still found this extension.
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Padding is usually some hundreds byte long. Longer padding might be used
as obfuscation technique to force unusual CH fragmentation
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Allocate heuristics state only if really needed.
Fix memory leak (it happened with WebSocket traffic on port 443)
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Based on the paper: "Fingerprinting Obfuscated Proxy Traffic with
Encapsulated TLS Handshakes".
See: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/xue-fingerprinting
Basic idea:
* the packets/bytes distribution of a TLS handshake is quite unique
* this fingerprint is still detectable if the handshake is
encrypted/proxied/obfuscated
All heuristics are disabled by default.
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* Revert "Added fix for handling Server Hello before CLient Hello"
This reverts commit eb15b22e7757cb70894fdcde440e62bc40f22df1.
* TLS: add some tests with unidirectional traffic
* TLS: another attempt to process CH received after the SH
Obviously, we will process unidirectional traffic longer, because we are
now waiting for messages in both directions
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```
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior protocols/tls.c:1812:22
=================================================================
==97754==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ba835bde8e5 at pc 0x557ebb644241 bp 0x7ffec04b0ea0 sp 0x7ffec04b0648
WRITE of size 7 at 0x7ba835bde8e5 thread T0
#0 0x557ebb644240 in vsnprintf (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x6bf240) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#1 0x557ebb645b1d in snprintf (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x6c0b1d) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#2 0x557ebb749dbc in ndpi_compute_ja4 /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1812:12
#3 0x557ebb7445a7 in processClientServerHello /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2946:10
#4 0x557ebb7073c9 in process_tls /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/quic.c:1397:3
#5 0x557ebb6ff815 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data.c:46:7
#6 0x557ebb602dcb in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x67ddcb) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#7 0x557ebb5ecea8 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x667ea8) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#8 0x557ebb5f299a in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x66d99a) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#9 0x557ebb61c482 in main (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x697482) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#10 0x7fa837e27082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-LcI20x/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
#11 0x557ebb5e7b5d in _start (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x662b5d) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
```
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Example:
./example/ndpiReader -i tests/pcap/safari.pcap --cfg=tls,metadata.ja4r_fingerprint,1
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Keep track if we received CH or/and SH messsages: usefull with
unidirectional flows
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Remove some code never triggered
AFP: the removed check is included in the following one
MQTT: fix flags extraction
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TODO: TCP reassembler on top of UDP reassembler
See: #2414
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See RFC8122: it is quite likely that STUN/DTLS/SRTP flows use
self-signed certificates
Follow-up of b287d6ec8
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The new values has been checked against the ones reported by Wireshark.
Found while fixing a Use-of-uninitialized-value error reported by
oss-fuzz
```
==7582==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x5a6549abc368 in ndpi_compute_ja4 ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1762:10
#1 0x5a6549ab88a0 in processClientServerHello ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2863:10
#2 0x5a6549ac1452 in processTLSBlock ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:909:5
#3 0x5a6549abf588 in ndpi_search_tls_tcp ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1098:2
#4 0x5a65499c53ec in check_ndpi_detection_func ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:7215:6
```
See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=68449&q=ndpi&can=1&sort=-id
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