/*
* quic.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2012-22 - ntop.org
*
* This module is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This module is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License.
* If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
*/
#if defined __FreeBSD__ || defined __NetBSD__ || defined __OpenBSD__
#include <sys/endian.h>
#endif
#include "ndpi_protocol_ids.h"
#define NDPI_CURRENT_PROTO NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC
#include "ndpi_api.h"
#ifdef USE_HOST_LIBGCRYPT
#include <gcrypt.h>
#else
#include <gcrypt_light.h>
#endif
/* This dissector handles GQUIC and IETF-QUIC both.
Main references:
* https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/proto-quic/c/wVHBir-uRU0?pli=1
* https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/proto-quic/c/OAVgFqw2fko/m/jCbjP0AVAAAJ
* https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/g/proto-quic/c/OAVgFqw2fko/m/-NYxlh88AgAJ
* https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FcpCJGTDEMblAs-Bm5TYuqhHyUqeWpqrItw2vkMFsdY/edit
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-29
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-29
*/
extern int processClientServerHello(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow, uint32_t quic_version);
extern int http_process_user_agent(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
const u_int8_t *ua_ptr, u_int16_t ua_ptr_len);
/* Versions */
#define V_1 0x00000001
#define V_Q024 0x51303234
#define V_Q025 0x51303235
#define V_Q030 0x51303330
#define V_Q033 0x51303333
#define V_Q034 0x51303334
#define V_Q035 0x51303335
#define V_Q037 0x51303337
#define V_Q039 0x51303339
#define V_Q043 0x51303433
#define V_Q046 0x51303436
#define V_Q050 0x51303530
#define V_T050 0x54303530
#define V_T051 0x54303531
#define V_MVFST_22 0xfaceb001
#define V_MVFST_27 0xfaceb002
#define V_MVFST_EXP 0xfaceb00e
#define QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH 20
static int is_version_gquic(uint32_t version)
{
return ((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500) /* T05X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303500) /* Q05X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303400) /* Q04X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303300) /* Q03X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303200) /* Q02X */;
}
static int is_version_quic(uint32_t version)
{
return version == V_1 ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xFF000000) /* IETF Drafts*/ ||
((version & 0xFFFFF000) == 0xfaceb000) /* Facebook */ ||
((version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a) /* Forcing Version Negotiation */ ||
(version == 0x709A50C4); /* V2 IETF Drafts */
}
static int is_version_valid(uint32_t version)
{
return is_version_gquic(version) || is_version_quic(version);
}
static uint8_t get_u8_quic_ver(uint32_t version)
{
/* IETF Draft versions */
if((version >> 8) == 0xff0000)
return (uint8_t)version;
/* QUIC (final?) constants for v1 are defined in draft-33, but latest
draft version is -34 */
if (version == 0x00000001) {
return 34;
}
if (version == V_MVFST_22)
return 22;
if (version == V_MVFST_27 || version == V_MVFST_EXP)
return 27;
/* "Versions that follow the pattern 0x?a?a?a?a are reserved for use in
forcing version negotiation to be exercised".
It is tricky to return a correct draft version: such number is primarly
used to select a proper salt (which depends on the version itself), but
we don't have a real version here! Let's hope that we need to handle
only latest drafts... */
if ((version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a)
return 29;
/* QUIC Version 2 */
/* For the time being use 100 as a number for V2 and let see how v2 drafts evolve */
if (version == 0x709A50C4)
return 100;
return 0;
}
static int is_quic_ver_less_than(uint32_t version, uint8_t max_version)
{
uint8_t u8_ver = get_u8_quic_ver(version);
return u8_ver && u8_ver <= max_version;
}
static int is_quic_ver_greater_than(uint32_t version, uint8_t min_version)
{
return get_u8_quic_ver(version) >= min_version;
}
static uint8_t get_u8_gquic_ver(uint32_t version)
{
if(is_version_gquic(version)) {
version = ntohl(((uint16_t)version) << 16);
return atoi((char *)&version);
}
return 0;
}
static int is_gquic_ver_less_than(uint32_t version, uint8_t max_version)
{
uint8_t u8_ver = get_u8_gquic_ver(version);
return u8_ver && u8_ver <= max_version;
}
static int is_version_supported(uint32_t version)
{
return (version == V_Q024 ||
version == V_Q025 ||
version == V_Q030 ||
version == V_Q033 ||
version == V_Q034 ||
version == V_Q035 ||
version == V_Q037 ||
version == V_Q039 ||
version == V_Q043 ||
version == V_Q046 ||
version == V_Q050 ||
version == V_T050 ||
version == V_T051 ||
version == V_MVFST_22 ||
version == V_MVFST_27 ||
version == V_MVFST_EXP ||
is_quic_ver_greater_than(version, 23));
}
static int is_version_with_encrypted_header(uint32_t version)
{
return is_version_quic(version) ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303500) /* Q05X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500) /* T05X */;
}
static int is_version_with_tls(uint32_t version)
{
return is_version_quic(version) ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500) /* T05X */;
}
int is_version_with_var_int_transport_params(uint32_t version)
{
return (is_version_quic(version) && is_quic_ver_greater_than(version, 27)) ||
(version == V_T051);
}
int is_version_with_ietf_long_header(uint32_t version)
{
/* At least draft-ietf-quic-invariants-06, or newer*/
return is_version_quic(version) ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303500) /* Q05X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500) /* T05X */;
}
static int is_version_with_v1_labels(uint32_t version)
{
if(((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x51303500) /* Q05X */ ||
((version & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0x54303500)) /* T05X */
return 1;
return is_quic_ver_less_than(version, 34);
}
static int is_version_quic_v2(uint32_t version)
{
return version == 0x709A50C4;
}
int quic_len(const uint8_t *buf, uint64_t *value)
{
*value = buf[0];
switch((*value) >> 6) {
case 0:
(*value) &= 0x3F;
return 1;
case 1:
*value = ntohs(*(uint16_t *)buf) & 0x3FFF;
return 2;
case 2:
*value = ntohl(*(uint32_t *)buf) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
return 4;
case 3:
*value = ndpi_ntohll(get_u_int64_t(buf, 0)) & 0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
return 8;
default: /* No Possible */
return 0;
}
}
int quic_len_buffer_still_required(uint8_t value)
{
switch(value >> 6) {
case 0:
return 0;
case 1:
return 1;
case 2:
return 3;
case 3:
return 7;
default: /* No Possible */
return 0;
}
}
static uint16_t gquic_get_u16(const uint8_t *buf, uint32_t version)
{
if(version >= V_Q039)
return ntohs(*(uint16_t *)buf);
return le16toh(*(uint16_t *)buf);
}
char *__gcry_err(gpg_error_t err, char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
gpg_strerror_r(err, buf, buflen);
/* I am not sure if the string will be always null-terminated...
Better safe than sorry */
if(buflen > 0)
buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
return buf;
}
static uint64_t pntoh64(const void *p)
{
return (uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+0)<<56|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+1)<<48|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+2)<<40|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+3)<<32|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+4)<<24|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+5)<<16|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+6)<<8|
(uint64_t)*((const uint8_t *)(p)+7)<<0;
}
static void phton64(uint8_t *p, uint64_t v)
{
p[0] = (uint8_t)(v >> 56);
p[1] = (uint8_t)(v >> 48);
p[2] = (uint8_t)(v >> 40);
p[3] = (uint8_t)(v >> 32);
p[4] = (uint8_t)(v >> 24);
p[5] = (uint8_t)(v >> 16);
p[6] = (uint8_t)(v >> 8);
p[7] = (uint8_t)(v >> 0);
}
static void *memdup(const uint8_t *orig, size_t len)
{
void *dest = ndpi_malloc(len);
if(dest)
memcpy(dest, orig, len);
return dest;
}
/*
* Generic Wireshark definitions
*/
#define HASH_SHA2_256_LENGTH 32
#define TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH 12
typedef struct _StringInfo {
unsigned char *data; /* Backing storage which may be larger than data_len */
unsigned int data_len; /* Length of the meaningful part of data */
} StringInfo;
/* QUIC decryption context. */
typedef struct quic_hp_cipher {
gcry_cipher_hd_t hp_cipher; /* Header protection cipher. */
} quic_hp_cipher;
typedef struct quic_pp_cipher {
gcry_cipher_hd_t pp_cipher; /* Packet protection cipher. */
uint8_t pp_iv[TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH];
} quic_pp_cipher;
typedef struct quic_ciphers {
quic_hp_cipher hp_cipher;
quic_pp_cipher pp_cipher;
} quic_ciphers;
typedef struct quic_decrypt_result {
uint8_t *data; /* Decrypted result on success (file-scoped). */
uint32_t data_len; /* Size of decrypted data. */
} quic_decrypt_result_t;
/*
* From wsutil/wsgcrypt.{c,h}
*/
static gcry_error_t ws_hmac_buffer(int algo, void *digest, const void *buffer,
size_t length, const void *key, size_t keylen)
{
gcry_md_hd_t hmac_handle;
gcry_error_t result = gcry_md_open(&hmac_handle, algo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
if(result) {
return result;
}
result = gcry_md_setkey(hmac_handle, key, keylen);
if(result) {
gcry_md_close(hmac_handle);
return result;
}
gcry_md_write(hmac_handle, buffer, length);
memcpy(digest, gcry_md_read(hmac_handle, 0), gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(algo));
gcry_md_close(hmac_handle);
return GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR;
}
static gcry_error_t hkdf_expand(int hashalgo, const uint8_t *prk, uint32_t prk_len,
const uint8_t *info, uint32_t info_len,
uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_len)
{
/* Current maximum hash output size: 48 bytes for SHA-384. */
uint8_t lastoutput[48];
gcry_md_hd_t h;
gcry_error_t err;
const unsigned int hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hashalgo);
/* Some sanity checks */
if(!(out_len > 0 && out_len <= 255 * hash_len) ||
!(hash_len > 0 && hash_len <= sizeof(lastoutput))) {
return GPG_ERR_INV_ARG;
}
err = gcry_md_open(&h, hashalgo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC);
if(err) {
return err;
}
for(uint32_t offset = 0; offset < out_len; offset += hash_len) {
gcry_md_reset(h);
gcry_md_setkey(h, prk, prk_len); /* Set PRK */
if(offset > 0) {
gcry_md_write(h, lastoutput, hash_len); /* T(1..N) */
}
gcry_md_write(h, info, info_len); /* info */
uint8_t c = offset / hash_len + 1;
gcry_md_write(h, &c, sizeof(c)); /* constant 0x01..N */
memcpy(lastoutput, gcry_md_read(h, hashalgo), hash_len);
memcpy(out + offset, lastoutput, MIN(hash_len, out_len - offset));
}
gcry_md_close(h);
return 0;
}
/*
* Calculate HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK according to RFC 5869.
* Caller MUST ensure that 'prk' is large enough to store the digest from hash
* algorithm 'hashalgo' (e.g. 32 bytes for SHA-256).
*/
static gcry_error_t hkdf_extract(int hashalgo, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
const uint8_t *ikm, size_t ikm_len, uint8_t *prk)
{
/* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) where salt is key, and IKM is input. */
return ws_hmac_buffer(hashalgo, prk, ikm, ikm_len, salt, salt_len);
}
/*
* From epan/dissectors/packet-tls-utils.c
*/
/*
* Computes HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Hash(context_value), Length) with a
* custom label prefix. If "context_hash" is NULL, then an empty context is
* used. Otherwise it must have the same length as the hash algorithm output.
*/
static int tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
const uint8_t *context_hash, uint8_t context_length,
uint16_t out_len, uint8_t **out)
{
/* RFC 8446 Section 7.1:
* HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, Context, Length) =
* HKDF-Expand(Secret, HkdfLabel, Length)
* struct {
* uint16 length = Length;
* opaque label<7..255> = "tls13 " + Label; // "tls13 " is label prefix.
* opaque context<0..255> = Context;
* } HkdfLabel;
*
* RFC 5869 HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF):
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*/
gcry_error_t err;
const unsigned int label_prefix_length = (unsigned int)strlen(label_prefix);
const unsigned label_length = (unsigned int)strlen(label);
#ifdef NDPI_ENABLE_DEBUG_MESSAGES
char buferr[128];
#endif
/* Some sanity checks */
if(!(label_length > 0 && label_prefix_length + label_length <= 255)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed sanity checks\n");
return 0;
}
/* info = HkdfLabel { length, label, context } */
/* Keep original Wireshark code as reference */
#if 0
GByteArray *info = g_byte_array_new();
const uint16_t length = htons(out_len);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const guint8 *)&length, sizeof(length));
const uint8_t label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length;
g_byte_array_append(info, &label_vector_length, 1);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const uint8_t *)label_prefix, label_prefix_length);
g_byte_array_append(info, (const uint8_t *)label, label_length);
g_byte_array_append(info, &context_length, 1);
if (context_length) {
g_byte_array_append(info, context_hash, context_length);
}
#else
uint32_t info_len = 0;
uint8_t *info_data = (uint8_t *)ndpi_malloc(1024);
if(!info_data)
return 0;
const uint16_t length = htons(out_len);
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], &length, sizeof(length));
info_len += sizeof(length);
const uint8_t label_vector_length = label_prefix_length + label_length;
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], &label_vector_length, 1);
info_len += 1;
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], (const uint8_t *)label_prefix, label_prefix_length);
info_len += label_prefix_length;
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], (const uint8_t *)label, label_length);
info_len += label_length;
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], &context_length, 1);
info_len += 1;
if(context_length) {
memcpy(&info_data[info_len], context_hash, context_length);
info_len += context_length;
}
#endif
*out = (uint8_t *)ndpi_malloc(out_len);
if(!*out)
return 0;
err = hkdf_expand(md, secret->data, secret->data_len, info_data, info_len, *out, out_len);
ndpi_free(info_data);
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed hkdf_expand: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
ndpi_free(*out);
*out = NULL;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int tls13_hkdf_expand_label(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
int md, const StringInfo *secret,
const char *label_prefix, const char *label,
uint16_t out_len, unsigned char **out)
{
return tls13_hkdf_expand_label_context(ndpi_struct, md, secret, label_prefix, label, NULL, 0, out_len, out);
}
/*
* From epan/dissectors/packet-quic.c
*/
static int quic_hkdf_expand_label(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
int hash_algo, uint8_t *secret, uint32_t secret_len,
const char *label, uint8_t *out, uint32_t out_len)
{
const StringInfo secret_si = { secret, secret_len };
uint8_t *out_mem = NULL;
if(tls13_hkdf_expand_label(ndpi_struct, hash_algo, &secret_si, "tls13 ", label, out_len, &out_mem)) {
memcpy(out, out_mem, out_len);
ndpi_free(out_mem);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void quic_hp_cipher_reset(quic_hp_cipher *hp_cipher)
{
gcry_cipher_close(hp_cipher->hp_cipher);
#if 0
memset(hp_cipher, 0, sizeof(*hp_cipher));
#endif
}
static void quic_pp_cipher_reset(quic_pp_cipher *pp_cipher)
{
gcry_cipher_close(pp_cipher->pp_cipher);
#if 0
memset(pp_cipher, 0, sizeof(*pp_cipher));
#endif
}
static void quic_ciphers_reset(quic_ciphers *ciphers)
{
quic_hp_cipher_reset(&ciphers->hp_cipher);
quic_pp_cipher_reset(&ciphers->pp_cipher);
}
/**
* Expands the secret (length MUST be the same as the "hash_algo" digest size)
* and initialize cipher with the new key.
*/
static int quic_hp_cipher_init(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_hp_cipher *hp_cipher, int hash_algo,
uint8_t key_length, uint8_t *secret,
uint32_t version)
{
uint8_t hp_key[256/8]; /* Maximum key size is for AES256 cipher. */
uint32_t hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_algo);
char const * const label = is_version_with_v1_labels(version) ? "quic hp" : "quicv2 hp";
if(!quic_hkdf_expand_label(ndpi_struct, hash_algo, secret, hash_len, label, hp_key, key_length)) {
return 0;
}
return gcry_cipher_setkey(hp_cipher->hp_cipher, hp_key, key_length) == 0;
}
static int quic_pp_cipher_init(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_pp_cipher *pp_cipher, int hash_algo,
uint8_t key_length, uint8_t *secret,
uint32_t version)
{
uint8_t write_key[256/8]; /* Maximum key size is for AES256 cipher. */
uint32_t hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_algo);
char const * const key_label = is_version_with_v1_labels(version) ? "quic key" : "quicv2 key";
char const * const iv_label = is_version_with_v1_labels(version) ? "quic iv" : "quicv2 iv";
if(key_length > sizeof(write_key)) {
return 0;
}
if(!quic_hkdf_expand_label(ndpi_struct, hash_algo, secret, hash_len, key_label, write_key, key_length) ||
!quic_hkdf_expand_label(ndpi_struct, hash_algo, secret, hash_len, iv_label, pp_cipher->pp_iv, sizeof(pp_cipher->pp_iv))) {
return 0;
}
return gcry_cipher_setkey(pp_cipher->pp_cipher, write_key, key_length) == 0;
}
/**
* Maps a Packet Protection cipher to the Packet Number protection cipher.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-22#section-5.4.3
*/
static int quic_get_pn_cipher_algo(int cipher_algo, int *hp_cipher_mode)
{
switch (cipher_algo) {
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES128:
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES256:
*hp_cipher_mode = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB;
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* (Re)initialize the PNE/PP ciphers using the given cipher algorithm.
* If the optional base secret is given, then its length MUST match the hash
* algorithm output.
*/
static int quic_hp_cipher_prepare(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_hp_cipher *hp_cipher, int hash_algo, int cipher_algo, uint8_t *secret, u_int32_t version)
{
#if 0
/* Clear previous state (if any). */
quic_hp_cipher_reset(hp_cipher);
#endif
int hp_cipher_mode;
if(!quic_get_pn_cipher_algo(cipher_algo, &hp_cipher_mode)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unsupported cipher algorithm\n");
return 0;
}
if(gcry_cipher_open(&hp_cipher->hp_cipher, cipher_algo, hp_cipher_mode, 0)) {
quic_hp_cipher_reset(hp_cipher);
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed to create HP cipher\n");
return 0;
}
if(secret) {
uint32_t cipher_keylen = (uint8_t)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
if(!quic_hp_cipher_init(ndpi_struct, hp_cipher, hash_algo, cipher_keylen, secret, version)) {
quic_hp_cipher_reset(hp_cipher);
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed to derive key material for HP cipher\n");
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int quic_pp_cipher_prepare(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_pp_cipher *pp_cipher, int hash_algo, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, uint8_t *secret, u_int32_t version)
{
#if 0
/* Clear previous state (if any). */
quic_pp_cipher_reset(pp_cipher);
#endif
if(gcry_cipher_open(&pp_cipher->pp_cipher, cipher_algo, cipher_mode, 0)) {
quic_pp_cipher_reset(pp_cipher);
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed to create PP cipher\n");
return 0;
}
if(secret) {
uint32_t cipher_keylen = (uint8_t)gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen(cipher_algo);
if(!quic_pp_cipher_init(ndpi_struct, pp_cipher, hash_algo, cipher_keylen, secret, version)) {
quic_pp_cipher_reset(pp_cipher);
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed to derive key material for PP cipher\n");
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int quic_ciphers_prepare(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_ciphers *ciphers, int hash_algo, int cipher_algo, int cipher_mode, uint8_t *secret, u_int32_t version)
{
return quic_hp_cipher_prepare(ndpi_struct, &ciphers->hp_cipher, hash_algo, cipher_algo, secret, version) &&
quic_pp_cipher_prepare(ndpi_struct, &ciphers->pp_cipher, hash_algo, cipher_algo, cipher_mode, secret, version);
}
/**
* Given a header protection cipher, a buffer and the packet number offset,
* return the unmasked first byte and packet number.
* If the loss bits feature is enabled, the protected bits in the first byte
* are fewer than usual: 3 instead of 5 (on short headers only)
*/
static int quic_decrypt_header(const uint8_t *packet_payload,
uint32_t pn_offset, quic_hp_cipher *hp_cipher,
int hp_cipher_algo, uint8_t *first_byte, uint32_t *pn,
int loss_bits_negotiated)
{
if(!hp_cipher->hp_cipher) {
/* Need to know the cipher */
return 0;
}
gcry_cipher_hd_t h = hp_cipher->hp_cipher;
/* Sample is always 16 bytes and starts after PKN (assuming length 4).
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-22#section-5.4.2 */
uint8_t sample[16];
memcpy(sample, packet_payload + pn_offset + 4, 16);
uint8_t mask[5] = { 0 };
switch (hp_cipher_algo) {
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES128:
case GCRY_CIPHER_AES256:
/* Encrypt in-place with AES-ECB and extract the mask. */
if(gcry_cipher_encrypt(h, sample, sizeof(sample), NULL, 0)) {
return 0;
}
memcpy(mask, sample, sizeof(mask));
break;
default:
return 0;
}
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-22#section-5.4.1 */
uint8_t packet0 = packet_payload[0];
if((packet0 & 0x80) == 0x80) {
/* Long header: 4 bits masked */
packet0 ^= mask[0] & 0x0f;
} else {
/* Short header */
if(loss_bits_negotiated == 0) {
/* Standard mask: 5 bits masked */
packet0 ^= mask[0] & 0x1F;
} else {
/* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ferrieuxhamchaoui-quic-lossbits-03#section-5.3 */
packet0 ^= mask[0] & 0x07;
}
}
uint32_t pkn_len = (packet0 & 0x03) + 1;
/* printf("packet0 0x%x pkn_len %d\n", packet0, pkn_len); */
uint8_t pkn_bytes[4];
memcpy(pkn_bytes, packet_payload + pn_offset, pkn_len);
uint32_t pkt_pkn = 0;
for(uint32_t i = 0; i < pkn_len; i++) {
pkt_pkn |= (uint32_t)(pkn_bytes[i] ^ mask[1 + i]) << (8 * (pkn_len - 1 - i));
}
*first_byte = packet0;
*pn = pkt_pkn;
return 1;
}
/**
* Given a QUIC message (header + non-empty payload), the actual packet number,
* try to decrypt it using the cipher.
* As the header points to the original buffer with an encrypted packet number,
* the (encrypted) packet number length is also included.
*
* The actual packet number must be constructed according to
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-22#section-12.3
*/
static void quic_decrypt_message(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
quic_pp_cipher *pp_cipher, const uint8_t *packet_payload, uint32_t packet_payload_len,
uint32_t header_length, uint8_t first_byte, uint32_t pkn_len,
uint64_t packet_number, quic_decrypt_result_t *result)
{
gcry_error_t err;
uint8_t *header;
uint8_t nonce[TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH];
uint8_t *buffer;
uint8_t atag[16];
uint32_t buffer_length;
#ifdef NDPI_ENABLE_DEBUG_MESSAGES
char buferr[128];
#endif
if(!(pp_cipher != NULL) ||
!(pp_cipher->pp_cipher != NULL) ||
!(pkn_len < header_length) ||
!(1 <= pkn_len && pkn_len <= 4)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed sanity checks\n");
return;
}
/* Copy header, but replace encrypted first byte and PKN by plaintext. */
header = (uint8_t *)memdup(packet_payload, header_length);
if(!header)
return;
header[0] = first_byte;
for(uint32_t i = 0; i < pkn_len; i++) {
header[header_length - 1 - i] = (uint8_t)(packet_number >> (8 * i));
}
/* Input is "header || ciphertext (buffer) || auth tag (16 bytes)" */
buffer_length = packet_payload_len - (header_length + 16);
if(buffer_length == 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Decryption not possible, ciphertext is too short\n");
ndpi_free(header);
return;
}
buffer = (uint8_t *)memdup(packet_payload + header_length, buffer_length);
if(!buffer) {
ndpi_free(header);
return;
}
memcpy(atag, packet_payload + header_length + buffer_length, 16);
memcpy(nonce, pp_cipher->pp_iv, TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH);
/* Packet number is left-padded with zeroes and XORed with write_iv */
phton64(nonce + sizeof(nonce) - 8, pntoh64(nonce + sizeof(nonce) - 8) ^ packet_number);
gcry_cipher_reset(pp_cipher->pp_cipher);
err = gcry_cipher_setiv(pp_cipher->pp_cipher, nonce, TLS13_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH);
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Decryption (setiv) failed: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
ndpi_free(header);
ndpi_free(buffer);
return;
}
/* associated data (A) is the contents of QUIC header */
err = gcry_cipher_authenticate(pp_cipher->pp_cipher, header, header_length);
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Decryption (authenticate) failed: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
ndpi_free(header);
ndpi_free(buffer);
return;
}
ndpi_free(header);
/* Output ciphertext (C) */
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt(pp_cipher->pp_cipher, buffer, buffer_length, NULL, 0);
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Decryption (decrypt) failed: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
ndpi_free(buffer);
return;
}
err = gcry_cipher_checktag(pp_cipher->pp_cipher, atag, 16);
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Decryption (checktag) failed: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
ndpi_free(buffer);
return;
}
result->data = buffer;
result->data_len = buffer_length;
}
/**
* Compute the client and server initial secrets given Connection ID "cid".
*/
static int quic_derive_initial_secrets(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
uint32_t version,
const uint8_t *cid, uint8_t cid_len,
uint8_t client_initial_secret[HASH_SHA2_256_LENGTH])
{
/*
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-tls-29#section-5.2
*
* initial_secret = HKDF-Extract(initial_salt, client_dst_connection_id)
*
* client_initial_secret = HKDF-Expand-Label(initial_secret,
* "client in", "", Hash.length)
*
* Hash for handshake packets is SHA-256 (output size 32).
*/
static const uint8_t handshake_salt_draft_22[20] = {
0x7f, 0xbc, 0xdb, 0x0e, 0x7c, 0x66, 0xbb, 0xe9, 0x19, 0x3a,
0x96, 0xcd, 0x21, 0x51, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x7a, 0x02, 0x64, 0x4a
};
static const uint8_t handshake_salt_draft_23[20] = {
0xc3, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x12, 0xc7, 0x2e, 0xbb, 0x5a, 0x11, 0xa7,
0xd2, 0x43, 0x2b, 0xb4, 0x63, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xf9, 0xf5, 0x02,
};
static const uint8_t handshake_salt_draft_29[20] = {
0xaf, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x28, 0x99, 0x93, 0xd2, 0x4c, 0x9e, 0x97,
0x86, 0xf1, 0x9c, 0x61, 0x11, 0xe0, 0x43, 0x90, 0xa8, 0x99
};
static const uint8_t hanshake_salt_draft_q50[20] = {
0x50, 0x45, 0x74, 0xEF, 0xD0, 0x66, 0xFE, 0x2F, 0x9D, 0x94,
0x5C, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0xF0, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0x6B, 0x45
};
static const uint8_t hanshake_salt_draft_t50[20] = {
0x7f, 0xf5, 0x79, 0xe5, 0xac, 0xd0, 0x72, 0x91, 0x55, 0x80,
0x30, 0x4c, 0x43, 0xa2, 0x36, 0x7c, 0x60, 0x48, 0x83, 0x10
};
static const uint8_t hanshake_salt_draft_t51[20] = {
0x7a, 0x4e, 0xde, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0xcc, 0xee, 0x5f, 0xa4, 0x50,
0x6c, 0x19, 0x12, 0x4f, 0xc8, 0xcc, 0xda, 0x6e, 0x03, 0x3d
};
static const uint8_t handshake_salt_v1[20] = {
0x38, 0x76, 0x2c, 0xf7, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x34, 0xb3, 0x4d, 0x17,
0x9a, 0xe6, 0xa4, 0xc8, 0x0c, 0xad, 0xcc, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x0a
};
static const uint8_t handshake_salt_v2_draft_00[20] = {
0xa7, 0x07, 0xc2, 0x03, 0xa5, 0x9b, 0x47, 0x18, 0x4a, 0x1d,
0x62, 0xca, 0x57, 0x04, 0x06, 0xea, 0x7a, 0xe3, 0xe5, 0xd3
};
gcry_error_t err;
uint8_t secret[HASH_SHA2_256_LENGTH];
#ifdef NDPI_ENABLE_DEBUG_MESSAGES
char buferr[128];
#endif
if(version == V_Q050) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, hanshake_salt_draft_q50,
sizeof(hanshake_salt_draft_q50),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if(version == V_T050) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, hanshake_salt_draft_t50,
sizeof(hanshake_salt_draft_t50),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if(version == V_T051) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, hanshake_salt_draft_t51,
sizeof(hanshake_salt_draft_t51),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if(is_quic_ver_less_than(version, 22)) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, handshake_salt_draft_22,
sizeof(handshake_salt_draft_22),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if(is_quic_ver_less_than(version, 28)) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, handshake_salt_draft_23,
sizeof(handshake_salt_draft_23),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if(is_quic_ver_less_than(version, 32)) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, handshake_salt_draft_29,
sizeof(handshake_salt_draft_29),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else if (is_quic_ver_less_than(version, 34)) {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, handshake_salt_v1,
sizeof(handshake_salt_v1),
cid, cid_len, secret);
} else {
err = hkdf_extract(GCRY_MD_SHA256, handshake_salt_v2_draft_00,
sizeof(handshake_salt_v2_draft_00),
cid, cid_len, secret);
}
if(err) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Failed to extract secrets: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
return -1;
}
if(!quic_hkdf_expand_label(ndpi_struct, GCRY_MD_SHA256, secret, sizeof(secret), "client in",
client_initial_secret, HASH_SHA2_256_LENGTH)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Key expansion (client) failed: %s\n", __gcry_err(err, buferr, sizeof(buferr)));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* End Wireshark code
*/
static uint8_t *decrypt_initial_packet(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
const uint8_t *dest_conn_id, uint8_t dest_conn_id_len,
uint8_t source_conn_id_len, uint32_t version,
uint32_t *clear_payload_len)
{
uint64_t token_length, payload_length, packet_number;
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
uint8_t first_byte;
uint32_t pkn32, pn_offset, pkn_len, offset;
quic_ciphers ciphers; /* Client initial ciphers */
quic_decrypt_result_t decryption = { 0, 0};
uint8_t client_secret[HASH_SHA2_256_LENGTH];
memset(&ciphers, '\0', sizeof(ciphers));
if(quic_derive_initial_secrets(ndpi_struct, version, dest_conn_id, dest_conn_id_len,
client_secret) != 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Error quic_derive_initial_secrets\n");
return NULL;
}
/* Packet numbers are protected with AES128-CTR,
Initial packets are protected with AEAD_AES_128_GCM. */
if(!quic_ciphers_prepare(ndpi_struct, &ciphers, GCRY_MD_SHA256,
GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_GCM,
client_secret, version)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Error quic_cipher_prepare\n");
return NULL;
}
/* Type(1) + version(4) + DCIL + DCID + SCIL + SCID */
pn_offset = 1 + 4 + 1 + dest_conn_id_len + 1 + source_conn_id_len;
pn_offset += quic_len(&packet->payload[pn_offset], &token_length);
pn_offset += token_length;
/* Checks: quic_len reads 8 bytes, at most; quic_decrypt_header reads other 20 bytes.
Promote to uint64_t to avoid unsigned wrapping */
if((uint64_t)pn_offset + 8 + (4 + 16) >= (uint64_t)packet->payload_packet_len) {
quic_ciphers_reset(&ciphers);
return NULL;
}
pn_offset += quic_len(&packet->payload[pn_offset], &payload_length);
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "pn_offset %d token_length %d payload_length %d\n",
pn_offset, token_length, payload_length);
if (pn_offset + payload_length > packet->payload_packet_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Too short %d %d\n", pn_offset + payload_length,
packet->payload_packet_len);
quic_ciphers_reset(&ciphers);
return NULL;
}
if(!quic_decrypt_header(&packet->payload[0], pn_offset, &ciphers.hp_cipher,
GCRY_CIPHER_AES128, &first_byte, &pkn32, 0)) {
quic_ciphers_reset(&ciphers);
return NULL;
}
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "first_byte 0x%x pkn32 0x%x\n", first_byte, pkn32);
pkn_len = (first_byte & 3) + 1;
/* TODO: is it always true in Initial Packets? */
packet_number = pkn32;
offset = pn_offset + pkn_len;
if (!(pn_offset + payload_length >= offset + 16)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "No room for Auth Tag %d %d",
pn_offset + payload_length, offset);
quic_ciphers_reset(&ciphers);
return NULL;
}
quic_decrypt_message(ndpi_struct,
&ciphers.pp_cipher, &packet->payload[0], pn_offset + payload_length,
offset, first_byte, pkn_len, packet_number, &decryption);
quic_ciphers_reset(&ciphers);
if(decryption.data_len) {
*clear_payload_len = decryption.data_len;
return decryption.data;
}
return NULL;
}
static void update_reasm_buf_bitmap(u_int8_t *buffer_bitmap,
const u_int32_t buffer_bitmap_size,
const u_int32_t recv_pos,
const u_int32_t recv_len)
{
if (!recv_len || !buffer_bitmap_size || recv_pos + recv_len > buffer_bitmap_size * 8)
return;
const u_int32_t start_byte = recv_pos / 8;
const u_int32_t end_byte = (recv_pos + recv_len - 1) / 8;
const u_int32_t start_bit = recv_pos % 8;
const u_int32_t end_bit = (start_bit + recv_len - 1) % 8;
if (start_byte == end_byte)
buffer_bitmap[start_byte] |= (((1U << recv_len) - 1U) << start_bit); // fill from bit 'start_bit' until bit 'end_bit', both inclusive
else{
for (u_int32_t i = start_byte + 1; i <= end_byte - 1; i++)
buffer_bitmap[i] = 0xff; // completely received byte
buffer_bitmap[start_byte] |= ~((1U << start_bit) - 1U); // fill from bit 'start_bit' until bit 7, both inclusive
buffer_bitmap[end_byte] |= (1U << (end_bit + 1U)) - 1U; // fill from bit 0 until bit 'end_bit', both inclusive
}
}
static int is_reasm_buf_complete(const u_int8_t *buffer_bitmap,
const u_int32_t buffer_len)
{
const u_int32_t complete_bytes = buffer_len / 8;
const u_int32_t remaining_bits = buffer_len % 8;
for(u_int32_t i = 0; i < complete_bytes; i++)
if (buffer_bitmap[i] != 0xff)
return 0;
if (remaining_bits && buffer_bitmap[complete_bytes] != (1U << (remaining_bits)) - 1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int __reassemble(struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow, const u_int8_t *frag,
uint64_t frag_len, uint64_t frag_offset,
const u_int8_t **buf, u_int64_t *buf_len)
{
const uint64_t max_quic_reasm_buffer_len = 4096; /* Let's say a couple of full-MTU packets... Must be multiple of 8*/
const uint64_t quic_reasm_buffer_bitmap_len = max_quic_reasm_buffer_len / 8;
const uint64_t last_pos = frag_offset + frag_len;
if(!flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf) {
flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf = (uint8_t *)ndpi_malloc(max_quic_reasm_buffer_len);
flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_bitmap = (uint8_t *)ndpi_calloc(quic_reasm_buffer_bitmap_len, sizeof(uint8_t));
if(!flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf || !flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_bitmap)
return -1; /* Memory error */
flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos = 0;
}
if(last_pos > max_quic_reasm_buffer_len)
return -3; /* Buffer too small */
memcpy(&flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf[frag_offset], frag, frag_len);
flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos = last_pos > flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos ? last_pos : flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos;
update_reasm_buf_bitmap(flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_bitmap, quic_reasm_buffer_bitmap_len, frag_offset, frag_len);
*buf = flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf;
*buf_len = flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos;
return 0;
}
static int is_ch_complete(const u_int8_t *buf, uint64_t buf_len)
{
uint32_t msg_len;
if(buf_len >= 4) {
msg_len = (buf[1] << 16) + (buf[2] << 8) + buf[3];
if (4 + msg_len == buf_len) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int is_ch_reassembler_pending(struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow)
{
return flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf != NULL &&
!(is_reasm_buf_complete(flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_bitmap, flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos)
&& is_ch_complete(flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf, flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_last_pos));
}
static const uint8_t *get_reassembled_crypto_data(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
const u_int8_t *frag,
uint64_t frag_offset, uint64_t frag_len,
uint64_t *crypto_data_len)
{
const u_int8_t *crypto_data;
int rc;
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "frag %d/%d\n", frag_offset, frag_len);
/* Fast path: no need of reassembler stuff */
if(frag_offset == 0 &&
is_ch_complete(frag, frag_len)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Complete CH (fast path)\n");
*crypto_data_len = frag_len;
return frag;
}
rc = __reassemble(flow, frag, frag_len, frag_offset,
&crypto_data, crypto_data_len);
if(rc == 0) {
if(is_reasm_buf_complete(flow->l4.udp.quic_reasm_buf_bitmap, *crypto_data_len) &&
is_ch_complete(crypto_data, *crypto_data_len)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Reassembler completed!\n");
return crypto_data;
}
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "CH not yet completed\n");
} else {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Reassembler error: %d\n", rc);
}
return NULL;
}
static const uint8_t *get_crypto_data(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
uint32_t version,
u_int8_t *clear_payload, uint32_t clear_payload_len,
uint64_t *crypto_data_len)
{
const u_int8_t *crypto_data = NULL;
uint32_t counter;
uint8_t first_nonzero_payload_byte, offset_len;
uint64_t unused, frag_offset, frag_len;
counter = 0;
while(counter < clear_payload_len && clear_payload[counter] == 0)
counter += 1;
if(counter >= clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
first_nonzero_payload_byte = clear_payload[counter];
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "first_nonzero_payload_byte 0x%x\n", first_nonzero_payload_byte);
if(is_gquic_ver_less_than(version, 46)) {
if(first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x40 ||
first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x60) {
/* Probably an ACK/NACK frame: this CHLO is not the first one but try
decoding it nonetheless */
counter += (first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x40) ? 6 : 9;
if(counter >= clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
first_nonzero_payload_byte = clear_payload[counter];
}
if((first_nonzero_payload_byte != 0xA0) &&
(first_nonzero_payload_byte != 0xA4)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected frame 0x%x version 0x%x\n",\
first_nonzero_payload_byte, version);
return NULL;
}
offset_len = (first_nonzero_payload_byte & 0x1C) >> 2;
if(offset_len > 0)
offset_len += 1;
if(counter + 2 + offset_len + 2 /*gquic_get_u16 reads 2 bytes */ > clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
if(clear_payload[counter + 1] != 0x01) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected stream ID version 0x%x\n", version);
return NULL;
}
counter += 2 + offset_len;
*crypto_data_len = gquic_get_u16(&clear_payload[counter], version);
counter += 2;
if(*crypto_data_len + counter > clear_payload_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Invalid length %lu + %d > %d version 0x%x\n",
(unsigned long)*crypto_data_len, counter, clear_payload_len, version);
return NULL;
}
crypto_data = &clear_payload[counter];
} else if(version == V_Q050 || version == V_T050 || version == V_T051) {
if(first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x40 ||
first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x60) {
/* Probably an ACK/NACK frame: this CHLO is not the first one but try
decoding it nonetheless */
counter += (first_nonzero_payload_byte == 0x40) ? 6 : 9;
if(counter >= clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
first_nonzero_payload_byte = clear_payload[counter];
}
if(first_nonzero_payload_byte != 0x08) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected frame 0x%x\n", first_nonzero_payload_byte);
return NULL;
}
counter += 1;
if(counter + 8 + 8 >= clear_payload_len) /* quic_len reads 8 bytes, at most */
return NULL;
counter += quic_len(&clear_payload[counter], &unused);
counter += quic_len(&clear_payload[counter], crypto_data_len);
if(*crypto_data_len + counter > clear_payload_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Invalid length %lu + %d > %d version 0x%x\n",
(unsigned long)*crypto_data_len, counter, clear_payload_len, version);
return NULL;
}
crypto_data = &clear_payload[counter];
} else { /* All other versions */
while(counter < clear_payload_len) {
uint8_t frame_type = clear_payload[counter];
switch(frame_type) {
case 0x00:
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "PADDING frame\n");
while(counter < clear_payload_len &&
clear_payload[counter] == 0)
counter += 1;
break;
case 0x01:
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "PING frame\n");
counter += 1;
break;
case 0x06:
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "CRYPTO frame\n");
counter += 1;
if(counter > clear_payload_len ||
counter + quic_len_buffer_still_required(clear_payload[counter]) > clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
counter += quic_len(&clear_payload[counter], &frag_offset);
if(counter > clear_payload_len ||
counter + quic_len_buffer_still_required(clear_payload[counter]) > clear_payload_len)
return NULL;
counter += quic_len(&clear_payload[counter], &frag_len);
if(frag_len + counter > clear_payload_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Invalid crypto frag length %lu + %d > %d version 0x%x\n",
(unsigned long)frag_len, counter, clear_payload_len, version);
return NULL;
}
crypto_data = get_reassembled_crypto_data(ndpi_struct, flow,
&clear_payload[counter],
frag_offset, frag_len,
crypto_data_len);
if(crypto_data) {
return crypto_data;
}
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Crypto reassembler pending\n");
counter += frag_len;
break;
case 0x1C: /* CC */
case 0x02: /* ACK */
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected CC/ACK frame\n");
return NULL;
default:
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected frame 0x%x\n", frame_type);
return NULL;
}
}
if(counter > clear_payload_len) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Error parsing frames %d %d\n", counter, clear_payload_len);
return NULL;
}
}
return crypto_data;
}
static uint8_t *get_clear_payload(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
uint32_t version, uint32_t *clear_payload_len)
{
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
u_int8_t *clear_payload;
u_int8_t dest_conn_id_len;
u_int8_t source_conn_id_len;
if(is_gquic_ver_less_than(version, 43)) {
clear_payload = (uint8_t *)&packet->payload[26];
*clear_payload_len = packet->payload_packet_len - 26;
/* Skip Private-flag field for version for < Q34 */
if(is_gquic_ver_less_than(version, 33)) {
clear_payload += 1;
(*clear_payload_len) -= 1;
}
} else if(version == V_Q046) {
if(packet->payload[5] != 0x50) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Q46 invalid conn id len 0x%x\n",
packet->payload[5]);
return NULL;
}
clear_payload = (uint8_t *)&packet->payload[30];
*clear_payload_len = packet->payload_packet_len - 30;
} else {
/* Upper limit of CIDs length has been already validated. If dest_conn_id_len is 0,
this is probably the Initial Packet from the server */
dest_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5];
if(dest_conn_id_len == 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Packet 0x%x with dest_conn_id_len %d\n",
version, dest_conn_id_len);
return NULL;
}
source_conn_id_len = packet->payload[6 + dest_conn_id_len];
const u_int8_t *dest_conn_id = &packet->payload[6];
clear_payload = decrypt_initial_packet(ndpi_struct,
dest_conn_id, dest_conn_id_len,
source_conn_id_len, version,
clear_payload_len);
}
return clear_payload;
}
static void process_tls(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
const u_int8_t *crypto_data, uint32_t crypto_data_len,
uint32_t version)
{
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
/* Overwriting packet payload */
u_int16_t p_len;
const u_int8_t *p;
p = packet->payload;
p_len = packet->payload_packet_len;
packet->payload = crypto_data;
packet->payload_packet_len = crypto_data_len;
processClientServerHello(ndpi_struct, flow, version);
flow->protos.tls_quic.hello_processed = 1; /* Allow matching of custom categories */
/* Restore */
packet->payload = p;
packet->payload_packet_len = p_len;
/* ServerHello is not needed to sub-classified QUIC, so we ignore it:
this way we lose JA3S and negotiated ciphers...
Negotiated version is only present in the ServerHello message too, but
fortunately, QUIC always uses TLS version 1.3 */
flow->protos.tls_quic.ssl_version = 0x0304;
/* DNS-over-QUIC: ALPN is "doq" or "doq-XXX" (for drafts versions) */
if(flow->protos.tls_quic.alpn &&
strncmp(flow->protos.tls_quic.alpn, "doq", 3) == 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Found DOQ (ALPN: [%s])\n", flow->protos.tls_quic.alpn);
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_DOH_DOT, NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
}
}
static void process_chlo(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow,
const u_int8_t *crypto_data, uint32_t crypto_data_len)
{
const uint8_t *tag;
uint32_t i;
uint16_t num_tags;
uint32_t prev_offset;
uint32_t tag_offset_start, offset, len;
ndpi_protocol_match_result ret_match;
int sni_found = 0, ua_found = 0;
if(crypto_data_len < 6)
return;
if(memcmp(crypto_data, "CHLO", 4) != 0) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unexpected handshake message");
return;
}
num_tags = le16toh(*(uint16_t *)&crypto_data[4]);
tag_offset_start = 8 + 8 * num_tags;
prev_offset = 0;
for(i = 0; i < num_tags; i++) {
if(8 + 8 * i + 8 >= crypto_data_len)
break;
tag = &crypto_data[8 + 8 * i];
offset = le32toh(*((u_int32_t *)&crypto_data[8 + 8 * i + 4]));
if(prev_offset > offset)
break;
len = offset - prev_offset;
/* Promote to uint64_t to avoid unsigned wrapping */
if((uint64_t)tag_offset_start + prev_offset + len > (uint64_t)crypto_data_len)
break;
#if 0
printf("crypto_data_len %u tag_offset_start %u prev_offset %u offset %u len %u\n",
crypto_data_len, tag_offset_start, prev_offset, offset, len);
#endif
if(memcmp(tag, "SNI\0", 4) == 0) {
ndpi_hostname_sni_set(flow, &crypto_data[tag_offset_start + prev_offset], len);
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "SNI: [%s]\n",
flow->host_server_name);
ndpi_match_host_subprotocol(ndpi_struct, flow,
flow->host_server_name,
strlen(flow->host_server_name),
&ret_match, NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC);
flow->protos.tls_quic.hello_processed = 1; /* Allow matching of custom categories */
ndpi_check_dga_name(ndpi_struct, flow,
flow->host_server_name, 1);
sni_found = 1;
if (ua_found)
return;
}
if(memcmp(tag, "UAID", 4) == 0) {
u_int uaid_offset = tag_offset_start + prev_offset;
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "UA: [%.*s]\n", len, &crypto_data[uaid_offset]);
http_process_user_agent(ndpi_struct, flow, &crypto_data[uaid_offset], len); /* http.c */
ua_found = 1;
if (sni_found)
return;
}
prev_offset = offset;
}
if(i != num_tags)
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Something went wrong in tags iteration\n");
/* Add check for missing SNI */
if(flow->host_server_name[0] == '\0') {
/* This is a bit suspicious */
ndpi_set_risk(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_TLS_MISSING_SNI);
}
}
static int may_be_initial_pkt(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
uint32_t *version)
{
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
u_int8_t first_byte;
u_int8_t pub_bit1, pub_bit2, pub_bit3, pub_bit4, pub_bit5, pub_bit7, pub_bit8;
u_int8_t dest_conn_id_len, source_conn_id_len;
/* According to draft-ietf-quic-transport-29: "Clients MUST ensure that UDP
datagrams containing Initial packets have UDP payloads of at least 1200
bytes". Similar limit exists for previous versions */
if(packet->payload_packet_len < 1200) {
return 0;
}
first_byte = packet->payload[0];
pub_bit1 = ((first_byte & 0x80) != 0);
pub_bit2 = ((first_byte & 0x40) != 0);
pub_bit3 = ((first_byte & 0x20) != 0);
pub_bit4 = ((first_byte & 0x10) != 0);
pub_bit5 = ((first_byte & 0x08) != 0);
pub_bit7 = ((first_byte & 0x02) != 0);
pub_bit8 = ((first_byte & 0x01) != 0);
*version = 0;
if(pub_bit1) {
*version = ntohl(*((u_int32_t *)&packet->payload[1]));
} else if(pub_bit5 && !pub_bit2) {
if(!pub_bit8) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Packet without version\n")
} else {
*version = ntohl(*((u_int32_t *)&packet->payload[9]));
}
}
if(!is_version_valid(*version)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Invalid version 0x%x\n", *version);
return 0;
}
if(is_gquic_ver_less_than(*version, 43) &&
(!pub_bit5 || pub_bit3 != 0 || pub_bit4 != 0)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x invalid flags 0x%x\n", *version, first_byte);
return 0;
}
if((*version == V_Q046) &&
(pub_bit7 != 1 || pub_bit8 != 1)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Q46 invalid flag 0x%x\n", first_byte);
return 0;
}
if(((is_version_quic(*version) && !is_version_quic_v2(*version)) ||
(*version == V_Q046) || (*version == V_Q050)) &&
(pub_bit3 != 0 || pub_bit4 != 0)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x not Initial Packet\n", *version);
return 0;
}
if(is_version_quic_v2(*version) &&
(pub_bit3 != 0 || pub_bit4 != 1)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x not Initial Packet\n", *version);
return 0;
}
/* Forcing Version Negotiation packets are QUIC Initial Packets (i.e.
Long Header). It should also be quite rare that a client sends this kind
of traffic with the QUIC bit greased i.e. having a server token.
Accordind to https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-quic-bit-grease-00#section-3.1
"A client MAY also clear the QUIC Bit in Initial packets that are sent
to establish a new connection. A client can only clear the QUIC Bit
if the packet includes a token provided by the server in a NEW_TOKEN
frame on a connection where the server also included the
grease_quic_bit transport parameter." */
if((*version & 0x0F0F0F0F) == 0x0a0a0a0a &&
!(pub_bit1 == 1 && pub_bit2 == 1)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x with first byte 0x%x\n", *version, first_byte);
return 0;
}
/* Check that CIDs lengths are valid: QUIC limits the CID length to 20 */
if(is_version_with_ietf_long_header(*version)) {
dest_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5];
source_conn_id_len = packet->payload[5 + 1 + dest_conn_id_len];
if (dest_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH ||
source_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CID_LENGTH) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "Version 0x%x invalid CIDs length %u %u",
*version, dest_conn_id_len, source_conn_id_len);
return 0;
}
}
/* TODO: add some other checks to avoid false positives */
return 1;
}
/* ***************************************************************** */
static int eval_extra_processing(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow, u_int32_t version)
{
/* For the time being we need extra processing in two cases only:
1) to detect Snapchat calls, i.e. RTP/RTCP multiplxed with QUIC.
We noticed that Snapchat uses Q046, without any SNI.
2) to reassemble CH fragments on multiple UDP packets.
These two cases are mutually exclusive
*/
if((version == V_Q046 &&
flow->host_server_name[0] == '\0') ||
is_ch_reassembler_pending(flow)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "We have further work to do\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int is_valid_rtp_payload_type(uint8_t type)
{
/* https://www.iana.org/assignments/rtp-parameters/rtp-parameters.xhtml */
return type <= 34 || (type >= 96 && type <= 127);
}
static void ndpi_search_quic(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow);
static int ndpi_search_quic_extra(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow)
{
struct ndpi_packet_struct *packet = &ndpi_struct->packet;
/* We are elaborating a packet following the initial CHLO/ClientHello.
Two cases:
1) Mutiplexing QUIC with RTP/RTCP. It should be quite generic, but
for the time being, we known only NDPI_PROTOCOL_SNAPCHAT_CALL having
such behaviour
2) CH reasssembling is going on */
/* TODO: could we unify ndpi_search_quic() and ndpi_search_quic_extra() somehow? */
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "search QUIC extra func\n");
if (is_ch_reassembler_pending(flow)) {
ndpi_search_quic(ndpi_struct, flow);
if(is_ch_reassembler_pending(flow))
return 1;
flow->extra_packets_func = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* RTP/RTCP stuff */
/* If this packet is still a Q046 one we need to keep going */
if(packet->payload[0] & 0x40) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Still QUIC\n");
return 1; /* Keep going */
}
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "No more QUIC: nothing to do on QUIC side\n");
flow->extra_packets_func = NULL;
/* This might be a RTP/RTCP stream: let's check it */
/* TODO: the cleanest solution should be triggering the rtp/rtcp dissector, but
I have not been able to that that so I reimplemented a basic RTP/RTCP detection.*/
if((packet->payload[0] >> 6) == 2 && /* Version 2 */
packet->payload_packet_len > 1 &&
(packet->payload[1] == 201 || /* RTCP, Receiver Report */
packet->payload[1] == 200 || /* RTCP, Sender Report */
is_valid_rtp_payload_type(packet->payload[1] & 0x7F)) /* RTP */) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Found RTP/RTCP over QUIC\n");
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_SNAPCHAT_CALL, NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
} else {
/* Unexpected traffic pattern: we should investigate it... */
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct, "To investigate...\n");
}
return 0;
}
static void ndpi_search_quic(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct,
struct ndpi_flow_struct *flow)
{
u_int32_t version;
u_int8_t *clear_payload;
uint32_t clear_payload_len = 0;
const u_int8_t *crypto_data;
uint64_t crypto_data_len;
int is_quic;
NDPI_LOG_DBG2(ndpi_struct, "search QUIC\n");
/* Buffers: packet->payload ---> clear_payload ---> crypto_data */
/*
* 1) (Very) basic heuristic to check if it is a QUIC packet.
* The first packet of each QUIC session should contain a valid
* CHLO/ClientHello message and we need (only) it to sub-classify
* the flow.
* Detecting QUIC sessions where the first captured packet is not a
* CHLO/CH is VERY hard. Let's try avoiding it and let's see if
* anyone complains...
*/
is_quic = may_be_initial_pkt(ndpi_struct, &version);
if(!is_quic) {
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
/*
* 2) Ok, this packet seems to be QUIC
*/
NDPI_LOG_INFO(ndpi_struct, "found QUIC\n");
ndpi_set_detected_protocol(ndpi_struct, flow, NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC, NDPI_PROTOCOL_UNKNOWN, NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI);
/*
* 3) Skip not supported versions
*/
if(!is_version_supported(version)) {
NDPI_LOG_DBG(ndpi_struct, "Unsupported version 0x%x\n", version);
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
/*
* 4) Extract the Payload from Initial Packets
*/
clear_payload = get_clear_payload(ndpi_struct, version, &clear_payload_len);
if(!clear_payload) {
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
return;
}
/*
* 5) Extract Crypto Data from the Payload
*/
crypto_data = get_crypto_data(ndpi_struct, flow, version,
clear_payload, clear_payload_len,
&crypto_data_len);
/*
* 6) Process ClientHello/CHLO from the Crypto Data (if any)
*/
if(crypto_data) {
if(!is_version_with_tls(version)) {
process_chlo(ndpi_struct, flow, crypto_data, crypto_data_len);
} else {
process_tls(ndpi_struct, flow, crypto_data, crypto_data_len, version);
}
}
if(is_version_with_encrypted_header(version)) {
ndpi_free(clear_payload);
}
/*
* 7) We need to process other packets than (the first) ClientHello/CHLO?
*/
if(eval_extra_processing(ndpi_struct, flow, version)) {
flow->check_extra_packets = 1;
flow->max_extra_packets_to_check = 24; /* TODO */
flow->extra_packets_func = ndpi_search_quic_extra;
} else if(!crypto_data) {
NDPI_EXCLUDE_PROTO(ndpi_struct, flow);
}
}
/* ***************************************************************** */
void init_quic_dissector(struct ndpi_detection_module_struct *ndpi_struct, u_int32_t *id,
NDPI_PROTOCOL_BITMASK *detection_bitmask)
{
ndpi_set_bitmask_protocol_detection("QUIC", ndpi_struct, detection_bitmask, *id,
NDPI_PROTOCOL_QUIC, ndpi_search_quic,
NDPI_SELECTION_BITMASK_PROTOCOL_V4_V6_UDP_WITH_PAYLOAD,
SAVE_DETECTION_BITMASK_AS_UNKNOWN, ADD_TO_DETECTION_BITMASK);
*id += 1;
}