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* Update libinjection code (#1918)Ivan Nardi2023-04-04
| | | | | | | | | | Update libinjection code to the current master https://github.com/libinjection/libinjection/commit/7e4b74e824dc3f0623ba4894df2a0d817351ec39 The goal is to finally fix #1820 See: https://github.com/libinjection/libinjection/issues/33 Update the corpus of the libinjection fuzzers Close #1820
* Ookla: rework detection (#1922)Ivan Nardi2023-03-30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The logic of the LRU cache has been changed: once we know an ip has connected to an Ookla server, all the following (unknown) flows (for a short time interval) from the same ip to the port 8080 are treated as Ookla ones. Most of the changes in this commit are about introducing the concept of "aggressive detection". In some cases, to properly detect a protocol we might use some statistical/behavior logic that, from one side, let us to identify the protocol more often but, from the other side, might lead to some false positives. To allow the user/application to easily detect when such logic has been triggered, the new confidence value `NDPI_CONFIDENCE_DPI_AGGRESSIVE` has been added. It is always possible to disable/configure this kind of logic via the API. Detection of Ookla flows using plain TLS over port 8080 is the first example of aggressive detection in nDPI. Tested with: * Android 9.0 with app 4.8.3 * Ubuntu 20.04 with Firefox 110 * Win 10 with app 1.15 and 1.16 * Win 10 with Chrome 108, Edge 108 and Firefox 106
* TLS: fix another interger overflow in certificate processing (#1915)Ivan Nardi2023-03-30
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* remove redefinition to vxlanhdr struct in vxlan dissector (#1911)Maatuq2023-03-25
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* TLS: fix parsing of certificate elements (#1910)Ivan Nardi2023-03-22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ``` ==1228==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6040000bed05 (pc 0x00000056e148 bp 0x7ffcca534320 sp 0x7ffcca5330c0 T0) ==1228==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access. #0 0x56e148 in processCertificateElements ndpi/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:682:79 #1 0x56c60f in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput ndpi/fuzz/fuzz_tls_certificate.c:43:3 #2 0x43de63 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:611:15 #3 0x4295c2 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:324:6 #4 0x42ee6c in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:860:9 #5 0x4583a2 in main /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:20:10 #6 0x7f8c021c9082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #7 0x41f78d in _start ``` Found by oss-fuzz. See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=57317
* Added the ability to define custom protocols with arbitrary Ids in proto.txtLuca Deri2023-03-22
| | | | | | | | | | Example - ip:213.75.170.11/32:443@CustomProtocol nDPI assigns an is that can change based on protos.txt content - ip:213.75.170.11/32:443@CustomProtocol=9999 nDPI assigns 9999 as protocolId to CustomProtocol and won't change when protos.txt content will chaneg
* Improved checks for duplicated entries in protocols fileLuca Deri2023-03-21
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* DisneyPlus/Hulu ip lists should be auto-generated (#1905)Ivan Nardi2023-03-20
| | | | | | Remove two stale ip lists: 1) these 3 ips are in the Amazon ranges (now)... 2) the Instagram list originated from AS32934, which is now a Facebook AS; see https://github.com/ntop/nDPI/pull/1264/commits/8dabd06301a802dd38616ba8684a1d995783e023
* Add a new protocol id for generic Adult Content traffic (#1906)Ivan Nardi2023-03-20
| | | | The list has been taken from https://www.similarweb.com/top-websites/adult/ Fix a GoTo false positive.
* Add a new protocol id for generic advertisement/analytics/tracking stuff (#1904)Ivan Nardi2023-03-20
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* fuzz: add a new fuzzer to test TLS certificates (#1901)Ivan Nardi2023-03-20
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* FreeBSD compilation fixLuca Deri2023-03-14
| | | | (C) update
* fuzz: simplify fuzzers dependencies in CIFuzz (#1896)Ivan Nardi2023-03-14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CIFuzz (based on oss-fuzz) is the GitHub action/CI job that runs fuzz targets on pull requests. It only runs the fuzzers affected by a pull request/commit. Otherwise it will divide up the allotted fuzzing time among all fuzzers in the project. Since: * we have more than 20 fuzzers and most of them use the custom memory allocation functions (to force allocation failures) even if they are not strictly about DPI stuff; * we need to keep fuzzing time relatively small (to avoid waiting the CI results for a long time) it is important that fuzzers dependencies (which are based on *files* changed by the single commit/PR) are as small as possible. Bottom line: move all the low-level allocation callbacks to a dedicated file; this way most of the fuzzers don't depend anymore on `ndpi_main.c` file (which is touched by ever commit/PR). The goal is to have only the "most important" fuzzers running during (most of) the CI.
* Added ability to define an unlimited number of custom rules IP:port for the ↵Luca Deri2023-03-13
| | | | same IP (it used tobe limited to 2)
* Minor cleanupLuca Deri2023-03-13
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* Added fix for better handling exceptions rollback in case of later matchLuca Deri2023-03-06
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* Add a new flow risk about literal IP addresses used as SNI (#1892)Ivan Nardi2023-03-02
| | | | | | | | | | RFC 6066 3: "Literal IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are not permitted in "HostName"." Don't set this risk if we have a valid sub-classification (example: via certificate) Since a similar risk already exists for HTTP hostnames, reuse it, with a more generic name.
* Fix insert of ip addresses into patricia tree(s) (#1895)Ivan Nardi2023-03-02
| | | Fix: d0b46dcf
* Keep master protocol in `ndpi_reconcile_protocols`Nardi Ivan2023-03-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As a side effect of this change, the following memory leak has been fixed. ``` ==55523==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x55657d01b7be in malloc (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_ndpi_reader_alloc_fail+0x5b27be) (BuildId: 9dfa7bd9081421417b8b1c2e8b44633a9bfcfe52) #1 0x55657d169182 in ndpi_malloc /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:243:25 #2 0x55657d1694c8 in ndpi_strdup /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:310:13 #3 0x55657d25ddc7 in processClientServerHello /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2308:46 #4 0x55657d2701b9 in processTLSBlock /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:895:5 #5 0x55657d26a408 in ndpi_search_tls_udp /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1223:11 ``` Found by oss-fuzz See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=56466
* SoftEther: fix invalid memory accessNardi Ivan2023-03-01
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We can't write `flow->protos` union until we are really sure about protocol classification ``` ==28334==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address (pc 0x558db5554512 bp 0x000000000000 sp 0x7ffcb22c2880 T0) ==28334==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==28334==Hint: this fault was caused by a dereference of a high value address (see register values below). Disassemble the provided pc to learn which register was used. #0 0x558db5554512 in __asan::Allocator::Deallocate(void*, unsigned long, unsigned long, __sanitizer::BufferedStackTrace*, __asan::AllocType) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_process_packet+0x48e512) (BuildId: 2f71e395637a7b748f36d5a04c7281f18b1128d7) #1 0x558db55ea54b in __interceptor_free (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_process_packet+0x52454b) (BuildId: 2f71e395637a7b748f36d5a04c7281f18b1128d7) #2 0x558db56977ca in ndpi_free /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:274:7 #3 0x558db56c20e3 in ndpi_free_flow_data /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:5175:2 #4 0x558db569783f in ndpi_free_flow /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:8394:5 #5 0x558db5627936 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_process_packet.c:38:3 ``` Found by oss-fuzz See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=56272
* Fixed uninitialized variableLuca Deri2023-02-27
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* Added missing breakLuca Deri2023-02-27
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* Improved protocol detection exploiting IP-based guessLuca Deri2023-02-27
| | | | Reworked ndpi_reconcile_protocols() that is now called only in front of a match (less overhead)
* Enhanced custom port definition and improved error reporting in case of ↵Luca Deri2023-02-24
| | | | duplications
* fuzz: extend fuzz coverage (#1888)Ivan Nardi2023-02-16
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* Fix export/serialization of `flow->risk` (#1885)Ivan Nardi2023-02-14
| | | | Any risks bigger than 31 was never exported/serialized; found looking a the fuzz coverage report.
* Fix packet counters (#1884)Ivan Nardi2023-02-13
| | | | | | We need to keep separete counters to keep tracks of packet numbers with and without any payload. Regression introduced in 5849863ef
* Fix detection of packet direction and NDPI_UNIDIRECTIONAL_TRAFFIC risk (#1883)Ivan Nardi2023-02-13
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* Centos7 fixesLuca Deri2023-02-13
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* Update roaring bitmap codeLuca Deri2023-02-12
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* Add Yandex services detection (#1882)0xA50C1A12023-02-09
| | | | | Add Yandex services detection Add VK and Yandex to the TLS certificate match list
* fuzz: some improvements and add two new fuzzers (#1881)Ivan Nardi2023-02-09
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove `FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION` define from `fuzz/Makefile.am`; it is already included by the main configure script (when fuzzing). Add a knob to force disabling of AESNI optimizations: this way we can fuzz also no-aesni crypto code. Move CRC32 algorithm into the library. Add some fake traces to extend fuzzing coverage. Note that these traces are hand-made (via scapy/curl) and must not be used as "proof" that the dissectors are really able to identify this kind of traffic. Some small updates to some dissectors: CSGO: remove a wrong rule (never triggered, BTW). Any UDP packet starting with "VS01" will be classified as STEAM (see steam.c around line 111). Googling it, it seems right so. XBOX: XBOX only analyses UDP flows while HTTP only TCP ones; therefore that condition is false. RTP, STUN: removed useless "break"s Zattoo: `flow->zattoo_stage` is never set to any values greater or equal to 5, so these checks are never true. PPStream: `flow->l4.udp.ppstream_stage` is never read. Delete it. TeamSpeak: we check for `flow->packet_counter == 3` just above, so the following check `flow->packet_counter >= 3` is always false.
* Add VK detection (#1880)0xA50C1A12023-02-02
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* File rename to avoid name clashes (e.g. on Windows)Luca Deri2023-01-31
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* Updated (C)Luca Deri2023-01-31
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* fuzz: add a new fuzzer to test serialization/deserialization code (#1876)Ivan Nardi2023-01-27
| | | | | | | | | | Autodetecting the needed buffer size is quite complex (especially with float/double values) so it is mandatory to properly check for `ndpi_snprintf` truncation. These issues have been undetected so far probably because the default buffer is big enough for all common cases. Add an example of usage of `ndpi_deserialize_clone_all()` (taken from `ntopng`)
* Improved connection refused detectionLuca Deri2023-01-25
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* Fix compilation and CI (#1875)Ivan Nardi2023-01-25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ubuntu-latest s390x CI doesn't like snapshot bigger than 262144 bytes. Fix an error found by fuzz CI ``` ================================================================= ==55399==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000000008 (pc 0x561e41cb684d bp 0x7ffd54ce3650 sp 0x7ffd54ce3520 T0) ==55399==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. ==55399==Hint: address points to the zero page. #0 0x561e41cb684d in ndpi_network_ptree_match /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:2321:41 #1 0x561e41d30879 in ndpi_guess_undetected_protocol /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:7767:8 #2 0x561e41ca804d in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config.cpp:104:5 #3 0x561e41bb96a0 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config+0x4726a0) (BuildId: d4741c753aafe7c0df2681a592b7df16b38240e9) #4 0x561e41ba3c2f in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config+0x45cc2f) (BuildId: d4741c753aafe7c0df2681a592b7df16b38240e9) #5 0x561e41ba96f6 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config+0x4626f6) (BuildId: d4741c753aafe7c0df2681a592b7df16b38240e9) #6 0x561e41bd22e2 in main (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config+0x48b2e2) (BuildId: d4741c753aafe7c0df2681a592b7df16b38240e9) #7 0x7f94f0e5c082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-SzIz7B/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16 #8 0x561e41b9eb0d in _start (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_config+0x457b0d) (BuildId: d4741c753aafe7c0df2681a592b7df16b38240e9) ```
* Update every ip lists (#1872)Ivan Nardi2023-01-25
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* CenOS compilation fixLuca Deri2023-01-25
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* Compilation fixesLuca Deri2023-01-25
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* Add some fuzzers to test other data structures. (#1870)Ivan Nardi2023-01-25
| | | | | | | Start using a dictionary for fuzzing (see: https://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html#dictionaries). Remove some dead code. Fuzzing with debug enabled is not usually a great idea (from performance POV). Keep the code since it might be useful while debugging.
* Some small changes (#1869)Ivan Nardi2023-01-25
| | | | | | | | All dissector callbacks should not be exported by the library; make static some other local functions. The callback logic in `ndpiReader` has never been used. With internal libgcrypt, `gcry_control()` should always return no errors. We can check `categories` length at compilation time.
* Added new risk NDPI_TCP_ISSUESLuca Deri2023-01-24
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* fuzz: fix memory allocation failure logic (#1867)Ivan Nardi2023-01-20
| | | | | We *do* want to have some allocation errors. Fix some related bugs Fix: 29be01ef
* Bittorrent: fix detection over TCP (#1868)Ivan Nardi2023-01-19
| | | Close #1866
* Minor changes in `ndpi_detection_giveup()` (#1861)Ivan Nardi2023-01-19
| | | | | | Check the mining cache at the end of the function, like all the others LRU caches. Rewrite the STUN checks: same identical semantic but in a cleaner way, hopefully
* Fix undefined-behaviour in ahocorasick callback (#1864)Ivan Nardi2023-01-19
| | | | | | | ``` ndpi_main.c:2119:28: runtime error: left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int' ``` Found by oss-fuzz See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=55226
* Bittorrent: fix heap-buffer-overflow (#1863)Ivan Nardi2023-01-19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ``` ==258287==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60600068ff9d at pc 0x5653a6e35def bp 0x7ffeef5aa620 sp 0x7ffeef5a9dc8 READ of size 22 at 0x60600068ff9d thread T0 #0 0x5653a6e35dee in strncmp (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_ndpi_reader+0x4d2dee) (BuildId: 133b8c3c8ff99408109fcb9be2538bb8341f07f7) #1 0x5653a70d6624 in ndpi_search_bittorrent /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/bittorrent.c:500:71 #2 0x5653a6ff255a in check_ndpi_detection_func /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:5686:6 #3 0x5653a6ff331b in check_ndpi_udp_flow_func /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:5722:10 #4 0x5653a6ff2cbc in ndpi_check_flow_func /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:5755:12 #5 0x5653a70016bf in ndpi_detection_process_packet /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:6578:15 #6 0x5653a6f1836d in packet_processing /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/../example/reader_util.c:1678:31 #7 0x5653a6f140a1 in ndpi_workflow_process_packet /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/../example/reader_util.c:2256:10 ``` Found by oss-fuzz See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=55218 Fix: 470eaa6f
* Shrinked symbolic flow risks labelsLuca Deri2023-01-19
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