| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
... | |
|
|
|
|
| |
* Improve TencentGames detection
* Add more signatures
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We are able to demultiplex RTP packets in STUN flows since 3608ab01b, at
least; no need to explicity call the RTP dissector
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add FLUTE protocol dissector
* Add flute.c to MSVC project
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Tradeoff between key comparison efficiency (i.e. no `memcmp`) and key
length.
At least in the ipv4 cases, we have no more different entries with the
same key.
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Tradeoff: performance (i.e. number of packets) vs sub-classification
|
|
|
| |
Same logic already used for Signal/Whatsapp/Line/Facebook/...
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
```
Direct leak of 12 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x55779e1a46ff in malloc (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/example/ndpiReader+0x8706ff) (BuildId: 14c2fc626744710d49d652ea1c5bbb24a8cbab4f)
#1 0x55779e2120c7 in ndpi_malloc_wrapper /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/example/ndpiReader.c:298:10
#2 0x55779e5fa215 in ndpi_malloc /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_memory.c:60:25
#3 0x55779e5fa500 in ndpi_strdup /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/ndpi_memory.c:113:13
#4 0x55779e42153c in processClientServerHello /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2554:46
#5 0x55779e4359a1 in processTLSBlock /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:908:5
#6 0x55779e432de7 in ndpi_search_tls_tcp /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1097:2
#7 0x55779e4133f9 in ndpi_search_tls_wrapper /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2913:5
```
Found by oss-fuzz
See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=67250
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add Path of Exile protocol dissector
* Update protocols.rst
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Is quite rare to have a SNI or an ALPN on Client Hello of STUN/DTLS/SRTP
traffic
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Follow up of 31c706c3dbbf0afc4c8e0a6d0bb6f20796296549 and
75485e177ccc4fafcc62dd46c6917d5b735cf7d2.
Allow fast classification by ip, but give time to other dissectors to
kick in (for example, the TLS code for the Telegram Web flows).
Even if we don't classify it anymore at the very first packet (i.e. SYN)
we fully classify Telegram traffic at the first packet with payload, as
*any* other protocol.
This way, we always have the proper category, the proper confidence
for the UDP flows and we don't overwrite previous classifications (TLS
or ICMP)
Remove old and stale identification logic for TCP flows
|
|
|
|
| |
path (#2320)
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add ANSI C12.22 protocol dissector
* Add UDP sample
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Skype has been using standard protocols (STUN/ICE or TLS) for a long,
long time, now. Long gone are the days of Skype as a distribuited
protocol.
See: #2166
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add detection of Gaijin Entertainment games
* Short NDPI_PROTOCOL_GAIJINENTERTAINMENT to NDPI_PROTOCOL_GAIJIN
* Add default UDP port for Gaijin Entertainment games
* Remove NDPI_PROTOCOL_CROSSOUT protocol id
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Follow-up of 4543385d107fcc5a7e8632e35d9a60bcc40cb4f4
Remove trailing spaces for any HTTP header (we already remove leading
spaces)
We want:
* a "normalized" string in `flow->host_server_name`, but
* to parse the original string for flow risk checking
`ndpi_hostname_sni_set()` is a private function, so there is no need to
export its flags.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Normalization of host_server_name
The ndpi_hostname_sni_set() function replaces all non-printable
characters with the "?" character and removing whitespace characters
at the end of the line.
* Added conditional hostname normalization.
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* additional JA4 string buffer is not needed and may cause a string truncation warning
```
protocols/tls.c: In function ‘ndpi_compute_ja4’:
protocols/tls.c:1738:3: warning: ‘strncpy’ output may be truncated copying 36 bytes from a string of length 1023 [-Wstringop-truncation]
1738 | strncpy(flow->protos.tls_quic.ja4_client, ja_str, 36);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
```
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <matzeton@googlemail.com>
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Found by oss-fuzzer
See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=66342
See: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=66320
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
protocol
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add missing NDPI_LOG_DBG
* Add missing NDPI_LOG_DBG in yojimbo.c
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Rename redis_net.c to resp.c
* Fix RESP detection
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <matzeton@googlemail.com>
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Improve MySQL detection
* Update copyright
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Add Radmin protocol dissector
* Update test results
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
QUIC decryption fails when the Client Hello is split into multiple UDP
packets and these packets have different Destination Connection IDs
(because the server told the client to switch to a different CID; see
RFC 9000 7.2)
```
The Destination Connection ID field from the first Initial packet sent by
a client is used to determine packet protection keys for Initial packets.
[..]
Upon first receiving an Initial or Retry packet from the server, the
client uses the Source Connection ID supplied by the server as the
Destination Connection ID for subsequent packets
```
From a logical point of view, the ciphers used for decryption should be
initialized only once, with the first Initial pkt sent by the client and
kept for later usage with the following packets (if any).
However it seems that we can safely initialize them at each packet, if
we keep using the DCID of the **first** packet sent by the client.
Keep initializing the ciphers at each packet greatly simplifie this patch.
This issue has been undetected for so long because:
* in the vast majority of the cases we only decrypt one packet per flow;
* the available traces with the Client Hello split into multiple packets
(i.e. cases where we need to decrypt at least two packets per flow) were
created in a simple test environment to simulate Post-Quantum handshake,
and in that scenario the client sent all the packets (with the same
DCID) before any reply from the server.
However, in the last months all major browsers started supporting PQ
key, so it is now common to have split CH in real traffic.
Please note that in the attached example, the CH is split into 2
(in-order) fragments (in different UDP packets) and the second one in
turn is divided into 9 (out-of-order) CRYPTO frames; the reassembler
code works out-of-the-box even in this (new) scenario.
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Toni Uhlig <matzeton@googlemail.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* Fix detection of new Cassandra versions
* Add Cassandra Internode Communication protocol support
* Add default port for Cassandra Internode Communication protocol
|