| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Based on the paper: "Fingerprinting Obfuscated Proxy Traffic with
Encapsulated TLS Handshakes".
See: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/xue-fingerprinting
Basic idea:
* the packets/bytes distribution of a TLS handshake is quite unique
* this fingerprint is still detectable if the handshake is
encrypted/proxied/obfuscated
All heuristics are disabled by default.
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u_int ndpi_hex2bin(u_char *out, u_int out_len, u_char* in, u_int in_len);
u_int ndpi_bin2hex(u_char *out, u_int out_len, u_char* in, u_int in_len);
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* Added ndpi_quick_encrypt() ndpi_quick_decrypt(0 APi calls based on AES
* Added aes.c
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```
==6591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x502000230000 (pc 0x55fbd836a5a0 bp 0x7ffdf4503670 sp 0x7ffdf4502e28 T0)
==6591==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x55fbd836a5a0 in __sanitizer::internal_strlen(char const*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.cpp:176:10
#1 0x55fbd82cfc28 in StrstrCheck(void*, char*, char const*, char const*) /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:579:17
#2 0x55fbd82cfbc2 in strstr /src/llvm-project/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:598:5
#3 0x55fbd840a04a in ndpi_strrstr /src/ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_utils.c:3471:15
#4 0x55fbd840ba95 in ndpi_get_host_domain /src/ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_domains.c:149:9
#5 0x55fbd83ef751 in ndpi_check_dga_name /src/ndpi/src/lib/ndpi_main.c:10748:17
```
Found by oss-fuzz
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Add dpi.guess_ip_before_port which when enabled uses classification
by-ip before classification by-port.
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Fixed bug in ndpi_get_host_domain
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* Revert "Added fix for handling Server Hello before CLient Hello"
This reverts commit eb15b22e7757cb70894fdcde440e62bc40f22df1.
* TLS: add some tests with unidirectional traffic
* TLS: another attempt to process CH received after the SH
Obviously, we will process unidirectional traffic longer, because we are
now waiting for messages in both directions
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We should have too big packets during the initial handshake
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Some fuzzers don't really need a real and complete local context.
Try to avoid setting it up, creating a simpler fake version with only the
features really needed.
That is a kind of experiment: if it works, we can extend the same logic
to other fuzzers
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"Invalid DNS Header"-risk should be set only if the flow has been
already classified as DNS. Otherwise, almost any non-DNS flows on port 53
will end up having the `NDPI_MALFORMED_PACKET` risk set, which is a little
bit confusing for non DNS traffic
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Based on the paper: "OpenVPN is Open to VPN Fingerprinting"
See: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/xue-diwen
Basic idea:
* the distribution of the first byte of the messages (i.e. the distribution
of the op-codes) is quite unique
* this fingerprint might be still detectable even if the OpenVPN packets are
somehow fully encrypted/obfuscated
The heuristic is disabled by default.
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```
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior protocols/tls.c:1812:22
=================================================================
==97754==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ba835bde8e5 at pc 0x557ebb644241 bp 0x7ffec04b0ea0 sp 0x7ffec04b0648
WRITE of size 7 at 0x7ba835bde8e5 thread T0
#0 0x557ebb644240 in vsnprintf (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x6bf240) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#1 0x557ebb645b1d in snprintf (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x6c0b1d) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#2 0x557ebb749dbc in ndpi_compute_ja4 /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:1812:12
#3 0x557ebb7445a7 in processClientServerHello /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/tls.c:2946:10
#4 0x557ebb7073c9 in process_tls /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/src/lib/protocols/quic.c:1397:3
#5 0x557ebb6ff815 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data.c:46:7
#6 0x557ebb602dcb in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x67ddcb) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#7 0x557ebb5ecea8 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned long) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x667ea8) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#8 0x557ebb5f299a in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned long)) (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x66d99a) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#9 0x557ebb61c482 in main (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x697482) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
#10 0x7fa837e27082 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-LcI20x/glibc-2.31/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:308:16
#11 0x557ebb5e7b5d in _start (/home/ivan/svnrepos/nDPI/fuzz/fuzz_quic_get_crypto_data+0x662b5d) (BuildId: ce17f7c48055e1f051360bed543c1e18c05f684f)
```
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Exported it with -E
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We can access `flow->l4.udp` structure only with UDP flows...
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* Extended API with functions for vector similarity based on KD-trees https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K-d_tree
ndpi_kd_tree* ndpi_kd_create(u_int num_dimensions);
void ndpi_kd_free(ndpi_kd_tree *tree);
void ndpi_kd_clear(ndpi_kd_tree *tree);
bool ndpi_kd_insert(ndpi_kd_tree *tree, const double *data_vector, void *user_data);
ndpi_kd_tree_result *ndpi_kd_nearest(ndpi_kd_tree *tree, const double *data_vector);
u_int32_t ndpi_kd_num_results(ndpi_kd_tree_result *res);
bool ndpi_kd_result_end(ndpi_kd_tree_result *res);
double* ndpi_kd_result_get_item(ndpi_kd_tree_result *res, double **user_data);
bool ndpi_kd_result_next(ndpi_kd_tree_result *res);
void ndpi_kd_result_free(ndpi_kd_tree_result *res);
double ndpi_kd_distance(double *a1, double *b2, u_int num_dimensions);
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We can do definitely better, but this change is a big improvements
respect the current broken code
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Example:
./example/ndpiReader -i tests/pcap/safari.pcap --cfg=tls,metadata.ja4r_fingerprint,1
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Allow sub-classification of OpenVPN/Wireguard flows using their server IP.
That is useful to detect the specific VPN application/app used.
At the moment, the supported protocols are: Mullvad, NordVPN, ProtonVPN.
This feature is configurable.
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Avoid forcing `DLT_EN10MB` but use the same data link type of the input
pcap.
This way, we can use extcap functionality with input traces having Linux
"cooked" capture encapsulation, i.e. traces captured on "any" interface
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