Fix Resharper warnings

6 files changed, 37 insertions, 37 deletions

diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/EfiGuardDxe.c b/EfiGuardDxe/EfiGuardDxe.c
index f61cfd6..4d28559 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/EfiGuardDxe.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/EfiGuardDxe.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ HookedLoadImage(
 		else
 		{
 			// Determine the type of file we're loading
-			CONST INPUT_FILETYPE FileType = GetInputFileType((UINT8*)LoadedImage->ImageBase, LoadedImage->ImageSize);
+			CONST INPUT_FILETYPE FileType = GetInputFileType(LoadedImage->ImageBase, LoadedImage->ImageSize);
 			ASSERT(FileType == Unknown || FileType == Bootmgr || FileType == BootmgfwEfi);
 
 			if (FileType == BootmgfwEfi)
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ HookedSetVariable(
 			Data != NULL)
 		{
 			// Yep, and Attributes and DataSize are correct. Check if *Data is a valid input for a backdoor read/write operation
-			EFIGUARD_BACKDOOR_DATA* BackdoorData = (EFIGUARD_BACKDOOR_DATA*)Data;
+			EFIGUARD_BACKDOOR_DATA* BackdoorData = Data;
 			if (BackdoorData->CookieValue == EFIGUARD_BACKDOOR_COOKIE_VALUE &&
 				BackdoorData->Size > 0 &&
 				(UINTN)BackdoorData->KernelAddress >= (UINTN)MM_SYSTEM_RANGE_START)
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ HookedSetVariable(
 						}
 						case 8:
 						{
-							CONST UINT64 NewQword = (UINT64)BackdoorData->u.Qword;
+							CONST UINT64 NewQword = BackdoorData->u.Qword;
 							BackdoorData->u.Qword = *(UINT64*)BackdoorData->KernelAddress;
 							if (!BackdoorData->IsReadOperation)
 								*(UINT64*)BackdoorData->KernelAddress = NewQword;
@@ -602,7 +602,7 @@ EfiGuardInitialize(
 	//
 	// Hook gRT->SetVariable
 	//
-	mOriginalSetVariable = (EFI_SET_VARIABLE)SetServicePointer(&gRT->Hdr, (VOID**)&gRT->SetVariable, (VOID**)&HookedSetVariable);
+	mOriginalSetVariable = (EFI_SET_VARIABLE)SetServicePointer(&gRT->Hdr, (VOID**)&gRT->SetVariable, (VOID*)&HookedSetVariable);
 	Print(L"Hooked gRT->SetVariable: 0x%p -> 0x%p\r\n", (VOID*)mOriginalSetVariable, (VOID*)&HookedSetVariable);
 
 	// Register notification callback for ExitBootServices()
diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchBootmgr.c b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchBootmgr.c
index 5c3c481..490d040 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchBootmgr.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchBootmgr.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ HookedBootManagerImgArchStartBootApplication(
 	}
 
 	// Determine if we're starting winload.efi, bootmgr.efi (when booting a WIM), or something else
-	FileType = GetInputFileType((UINT8*)ImageBase, (UINTN)ImageSize);
+	FileType = GetInputFileType(ImageBase, (UINTN)ImageSize);
 	if (FileType != WinloadEfi && FileType != BootmgrEfi)
 	{
 		// Nothing for us to do
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ PatchBootManager(
 	// Found signature; backtrack to function start
 	// Note: pOriginalAddress is a pointer to a (function) pointer, because the original address depends on the type of boot manager we are patching.
 	VOID **pOriginalAddress = PatchingBootmgrEfi ? &gOriginalBootmgrImgArchStartBootApplication : &gOriginalBootmgfwImgArchStartBootApplication;
-	*pOriginalAddress = (VOID*)BacktrackToFunctionStart((UINT8*)ImageBase, NtHeaders, Found);
+	*pOriginalAddress = (VOID*)BacktrackToFunctionStart(ImageBase, NtHeaders, Found);
 	CONST VOID* OriginalAddress = *pOriginalAddress;
 	if (OriginalAddress == NULL)
 	{
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ PatchBootManager(
 	CopyMem(BackupAddress, (VOID*)OriginalAddress, sizeof(gHookTemplate));
 
 	// Place faux call (push addr, ret) at the start of the function to transfer execution to our hook
-	CopyMem((VOID*)OriginalAddress, (VOID*)gHookTemplate, sizeof(gHookTemplate));
+	CopyMem((VOID*)OriginalAddress, gHookTemplate, sizeof(gHookTemplate));
 	*(UINTN*)((UINT8*)OriginalAddress + 2) = (UINTN)HookAddress;
 
 	gBS->RestoreTPL(Tpl);
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ PatchBootManager(
 	// Patch ImgpValidateImageHash to allow custom boot loaders. This is completely
 	// optional (unless booting a custom winload.efi), and failures are ignored
 	PatchImgpValidateImageHash(FileType,
-								(UINT8*)ImageBase,
+								ImageBase,
 								NtHeaders);
 
 	if (BuildNumber >= 7600)
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ PatchBootManager(
 		// Patch ImgpFilterValidationFailure so it doesn't silently
 		// rat out every violation to a TPM or SI log. Also optional
 		PatchImgpFilterValidationFailure(FileType,
-										(UINT8*)ImageBase,
+										ImageBase,
 										NtHeaders);
 	}
 
diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchNtoskrnl.c b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchNtoskrnl.c
index ac8f181..8746e3c 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchNtoskrnl.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchNtoskrnl.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ DisablePatchGuard(
 	// Search for KeInitAmd64SpecificState
 	PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"\r\n== Searching for nt!KeInitAmd64SpecificState pattern in INIT ==\r\n");
 	UINT8* KeInitAmd64SpecificStatePatternAddress = NULL;
-	for (UINT8* Address = (UINT8*)StartVa; Address < StartVa + SizeOfRawData - sizeof(SigKeInitAmd64SpecificState); ++Address)
+	for (UINT8* Address = StartVa; Address < StartVa + SizeOfRawData - sizeof(SigKeInitAmd64SpecificState); ++Address)
 	{
 		if (CompareMem(Address, SigKeInitAmd64SpecificState, sizeof(SigKeInitAmd64SpecificState)) == 0)
 		{
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ DisablePatchGuard(
 		CONST EFI_STATUS FindKiVerifyScopesExecuteStatus = FindPattern(SigKiVerifyScopesExecute,
 																	0xCC,
 																	sizeof(SigKiVerifyScopesExecute),
-																	(VOID*)StartVa,
+																	StartVa,
 																	SizeOfRawData,
 																	(VOID**)&KiVerifyScopesExecutePatternAddress);
 		if (EFI_ERROR(FindKiVerifyScopesExecuteStatus))
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ DisablePatchGuard(
 		// Search for KiMcaDeferredRecoveryService
 		PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"== Searching for nt!KiMcaDeferredRecoveryService pattern in .text ==\r\n");
 		UINT8* KiMcaDeferredRecoveryService = NULL;
-		for (UINT8* Address = (UINT8*)StartVa; Address < StartVa + SizeOfRawData - sizeof(SigKiMcaDeferredRecoveryService); ++Address)
+		for (UINT8* Address = StartVa; Address < StartVa + SizeOfRawData - sizeof(SigKiMcaDeferredRecoveryService); ++Address)
 		{
 			if (CompareMem(Address, SigKiMcaDeferredRecoveryService, sizeof(SigKiMcaDeferredRecoveryService)) == 0)
 			{
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ DisablePatchGuard(
 		CONST EFI_STATUS FindKiSwInterruptStatus = FindPattern(SigKiSwInterrupt,
 																0xCC,
 																sizeof(SigKiSwInterrupt),
-																(VOID*)StartVa,
+																StartVa,
 																SizeOfRawData,
 																(VOID**)&KiSwInterruptPatternAddress);
 		if (EFI_ERROR(FindKiSwInterruptStatus))
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ DisableDSE(
 				Instruction.operands[0].type == ZYDIS_OPERAND_TYPE_MEMORY && Instruction.operands[0].mem.base == ZYDIS_REGISTER_RIP &&
 				Instruction.operands[1].type == ZYDIS_OPERAND_TYPE_REGISTER)
 			{
-				if (ZYAN_SUCCESS(ZydisCalcAbsoluteAddress(&Instruction, &Instruction.operands[0], InstructionAddress, (ZyanU64*)&gCiEnabled)))
+				if (ZYAN_SUCCESS(ZydisCalcAbsoluteAddress(&Instruction, &Instruction.operands[0], InstructionAddress, &gCiEnabled)))
 				{
 					PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"    Found g_CiEnabled at 0x%llX.\r\n", gCiEnabled);
 					break;
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ DisableDSE(
 	if (BuildNumber < 9200)
 		*SeValidateImageDataJzAddress = 0xEB;															// jmp
 	else if (BypassType == DSE_DISABLE_AT_BOOT)
-		*(UINT32*)((UINT8*)SeValidateImageDataMovEaxAddress + 1 /*skip existing mov opcode*/) = 0x0;	// mov eax, 0
+		*(UINT32*)(SeValidateImageDataMovEaxAddress + 1 /*skip existing mov opcode*/) = 0x0;	// mov eax, 0
 
 	if (BuildNumber >= 16299 && BypassType == DSE_DISABLE_AT_BOOT)
 	{
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ DisableDSE(
 		}
 		else
 		{
-			CopyMem((VOID*)Found, (VOID*)SeCodeIntegrityQueryInformationPatch, sizeof(SeCodeIntegrityQueryInformationPatch));
+			CopyMem(Found, SeCodeIntegrityQueryInformationPatch, sizeof(SeCodeIntegrityQueryInformationPatch));
 			PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"\r\nPatched SeCodeIntegrityQueryInformation [RVA: 0x%X].\r\n", (UINT32)(Found - ImageBase));
 		}
 	}
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ PatchNtoskrnl(
 	// Print file and version info
 	UINT16 MajorVersion = 0, MinorVersion = 0, BuildNumber = 0, Revision = 0;
 	UINT32 FileFlags = 0;
-	EFI_STATUS Status = GetPeFileVersionInfo((VOID*)ImageBase, &MajorVersion, &MinorVersion, &BuildNumber, &Revision, &FileFlags);
+	EFI_STATUS Status = GetPeFileVersionInfo(ImageBase, &MajorVersion, &MinorVersion, &BuildNumber, &Revision, &FileFlags);
 	if (EFI_ERROR(Status))
 	{
 		PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"[PatchNtoskrnl] WARNING: failed to obtain ntoskrnl.exe version info. Status: %llx\r\n", Status);
@@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ PatchNtoskrnl(
 	// Patch INIT and .text sections to disable PatchGuard
 	PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"[PatchNtoskrnl] Disabling PatchGuard... [INIT RVA: 0x%X - 0x%X]\r\n",
 		InitSection->VirtualAddress, InitSection->VirtualAddress + InitSection->SizeOfRawData);
-	Status = DisablePatchGuard((UINT8*)ImageBase,
+	Status = DisablePatchGuard(ImageBase,
 								NtHeaders,
 								InitSection,
 								TextSection,
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ PatchNtoskrnl(
 		PRINT_KERNEL_PATCH_MSG(L"[PatchNtoskrnl] %S... [PAGE RVA: 0x%X - 0x%X]\r\n",
 			gDriverConfig.DseBypassMethod == DSE_DISABLE_AT_BOOT ? L"Disabling DSE" : L"Ensuring safe DSE bypass",
 			PageSection->VirtualAddress, PageSection->VirtualAddress + PageSection->SizeOfRawData);
-		Status = DisableDSE((UINT8*)ImageBase,
+		Status = DisableDSE(ImageBase,
 							NtHeaders,
 							PageSection,
 							gDriverConfig.DseBypassMethod,
diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchWinload.c b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchWinload.c
index a36f8b6..32f10db 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/PatchWinload.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/PatchWinload.c
@@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ PatchImgpFilterValidationFailure(
 	{
 		if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".text", sizeof(".text") - 1) == 0)
 			CodeSection = Section;
-		if ((FileType == BootmgfwEfi || FileType == BootmgrEfi) &&
+		if (((FileType == BootmgfwEfi || FileType == BootmgrEfi) &&
 			CompareMem(Section->Name, ".text", sizeof(".text") - 1) == 0) // [bootmgfw|bootmgr].efi (usually) has no .rdata section, and starting at .text is always fine
-			PatternSection = Section;
-		else if ((FileType == WinloadExe || FileType == WinloadEfi) &&
-			CompareMem(Section->Name, ".rdata", sizeof(".rdata") - 1) == 0) // For winload.[exe|efi] the string is in .rdata
+			||
+			((FileType == WinloadExe || FileType == WinloadEfi) &&
+			CompareMem(Section->Name, ".rdata", sizeof(".rdata") - 1) == 0)) // For winload.[exe|efi] the string is in .rdata
 			PatternSection = Section;
 		Section++;
 	}
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ PatchImgpFilterValidationFailure(
 	CONST UINT8* PatternStartVa = ImageBase + PatternStartRva;
 
 	CHAR8 SectionName[EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME + 1];
-	CopyMem((VOID*)SectionName, (VOID*)PatternSection->Name, EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME);
+	CopyMem(SectionName, PatternSection->Name, EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME);
 	SectionName[EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME] = '\0';
 	Print(L"\r\n== Searching for load failure string in %a [RVA: 0x%X - 0x%X] ==\r\n",
 		SectionName, PatternStartRva, PatternStartRva + PatternSizeOfRawData);
@@ -278,8 +278,8 @@ PatchImgpFilterValidationFailure(
 	CONST UINT32 CodeSizeOfRawData = CodeSection->SizeOfRawData;
 	CONST UINT8* CodeStartVa = ImageBase + CodeStartRva;
 
-	ZeroMem((VOID*)SectionName, sizeof(SectionName));
-	CopyMem((VOID*)SectionName, (VOID*)CodeSection->Name, EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME);
+	ZeroMem(SectionName, sizeof(SectionName));
+	CopyMem(SectionName, CodeSection->Name, EFI_IMAGE_SIZEOF_SHORT_NAME);
 	Print(L"== Disassembling %a to find %S!ImgpFilterValidationFailure ==\r\n", SectionName, ShortName);
 	UINT8* LeaIntegrityFailureAddress = NULL;
 
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ PatchWinload(
 			FindPattern(SigBlStatusPrint,
 						0xCC,
 						sizeof(SigBlStatusPrint),
-						(VOID*)((UINT8*)ImageBase + CodeSection->VirtualAddress),
+						(UINT8*)ImageBase + CodeSection->VirtualAddress,
 						CodeSection->SizeOfRawData,
 						(VOID**)&gBlStatusPrint);
 			if (gBlStatusPrint == NULL)
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ PatchWinload(
 	}
 
 	// Find winload!OslFwpKernelSetupPhase1
-	Status = FindOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1((UINT8*)ImageBase,
+	Status = FindOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1(ImageBase,
 										NtHeaders,
 										CodeSection,
 										PatternSection,
@@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ PatchWinload(
 	CopyMem(gOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1Backup, (VOID*)gOriginalOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1, sizeof(gOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1Backup));
 
 	// Place faux call (push addr, ret) at the start of the function to transfer execution to our hook
-	CopyMem((VOID*)gOriginalOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1, (VOID*)gHookTemplate, sizeof(gHookTemplate));
+	CopyMem((VOID*)gOriginalOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1, gHookTemplate, sizeof(gHookTemplate));
 	*(UINTN*)((UINT8*)gOriginalOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1 + 2) = (UINTN)&HookedOslFwpKernelSetupPhase1;
 
 	gBS->RestoreTPL(Tpl);
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ PatchWinload(
 	// Patch ImgpValidateImageHash to allow custom boot loaders. This is completely
 	// optional (unless booting a custom ntoskrnl.exe), and failures are ignored
 	PatchImgpValidateImageHash(WinloadEfi,
-								(UINT8*)ImageBase,
+								ImageBase,
 								NtHeaders);
 
 	if (BuildNumber >= 7600)
@@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ PatchWinload(
 		// Patch ImgpFilterValidationFailure so it doesn't silently
 		// rat out every violation to a TPM or SI log. Also optional
 		PatchImgpFilterValidationFailure(WinloadEfi,
-										(UINT8*)ImageBase,
+										ImageBase,
 										NtHeaders);
 	}
 
diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/pe.c b/EfiGuardDxe/pe.c
index 9ecaf57..d7c0032 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/pe.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/pe.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ GetInputFileType(
 	// Brute force scan .rsrc to check if this is either winload.efi or bootmgr.efi.
 	// We've already eliminated bootmgr and bootmgfw.efi as candidates, so there will be no false positives
 	UINT32 Size = 0;
-	EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY *ResourceDirTable = (EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY*)
+	EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY *ResourceDirTable =
 		RtlpImageDirectoryEntryToDataEx(ImageBase,
 										TRUE,
 										EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE,
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ FindIATAddressForImport(
 
 	// Get the import descriptor table
 	UINT32 ImportDirSize;
-	CONST PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR DescriptorTable = (PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR)
+	CONST PIMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR DescriptorTable =
 		RtlpImageDirectoryEntryToDataEx(ImageBase,
 										TRUE,
 										EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_IMPORT,
@@ -365,10 +365,10 @@ RtlpImageDirectoryEntryToDataEx(
 	*Size = Directories[DirectoryEntry].Size;
 	if (MappedAsImage || Rva < HEADER_FIELD(NtHeaders, SizeOfHeaders))
 	{
-		return (VOID*)((UINT8*)(Base) + Rva);
+		return (UINT8*)(Base) + Rva;
 	}
 
-	return (VOID*)((UINT8*)(Base) + RvaToOffset(NtHeaders, Rva));
+	return (UINT8*)(Base) + RvaToOffset(NtHeaders, Rva);
 }
 
 // Similar to LdrFindResource_U + LdrAccessResource combined, with some shortcuts for size optimization:
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ FindResourceDataById(
 	ASSERT((!LDR_IS_DATAFILE(ImageBase)));
 
 	UINT32 Size = 0;
-	EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY *ResourceDirTable = (EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY*)
+	EFI_IMAGE_RESOURCE_DIRECTORY *ResourceDirTable =
 		RtlpImageDirectoryEntryToDataEx(ImageBase,
 										TRUE,
 										EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_RESOURCE,
diff --git a/EfiGuardDxe/util.c b/EfiGuardDxe/util.c
index 6d45675..011dab2 100644
--- a/EfiGuardDxe/util.c
+++ b/EfiGuardDxe/util.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ AppendKernelPatchMessage(
 	gKernelPatchInfo.BufferSize += (NumCharsPrinted * sizeof(CHAR16));
 
 	// Paranoid null terminator (UnicodeVSPrint should do this)
-	*(CHAR16*)(gKernelPatchInfo.Buffer + (gKernelPatchInfo.BufferSize / sizeof(CHAR16))) = CHAR_NULL;
+	*(gKernelPatchInfo.Buffer + (gKernelPatchInfo.BufferSize / sizeof(CHAR16))) = CHAR_NULL;
 
 	// Separate the next message using the null terminator. This is because most Print() implementations crap out
 	// after ~4 lines (depending on PCDs), so we will print the final buffer using multiple calls to Print()